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Abstract
In 1994 Harold Acton, son of Arthur Acton, an English art dealer in Flo-
rence, and Hortense Mitchell Acton, an American banking heiress, donated
his family home, Villa La Pietra, to New York University. Today, this Tus-
can villa is at the center of a declaration of paternity lawsuit and a claim of
inheritance brought by Liana Beacci, Arthur Acton’s daughter by his Italian
secretary. In this Note, Felicia Caponigri presents the facts of the case, focus-
ing on the provenance of the Villa, and the procedural posture of the case.
Caponigri applies Italian law to argue that NewYork University might claim
clear title to the Villa if Hortense’s father gave her the Villa, or if Hortense
set up a legal entity in which she placed title to Villa La Pietra. Caponigri
also argues the Beacci might have a colorable claim if Hortense and Arthur
Acton acquired the Villa together.
I Introduction
A Present Day Villa La Pietra
A thirty-minute walk from the hustle and bustle of Florence’s centro storico,
at the very top of a steep hill along the Via Bolognese, behind stuccoed walls
and imposing iron gates, within hushed olive groves, rest fifty-seven acres of
Tuscan paradise.1 Every semester, more than three hundredNewYork University
(“NYU”) students, including one hundred freshmen, arrive there to discover
Italian culture, speak the Italian language, and immerse themselves in art history,
1 The website of New York University’s Office of Global Programs describes Villa La Pietra
as “the outstanding historical villa and home of the New York University Florence program. Be-
queathed to NYU in 1994 by Sir Harold Acton, the Florentine study abroad campus consists of
5 historic villas and 57 acres of gardens and olive groves.” Villa La Pietra, N.Y.U. Off. of Glob.
Programs, http://www.nyu.edu/global/lapietra/ (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
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literature, and other subjects curated within the Italian perspective.2 When not
in the classroom, students take part in a number of student activities on the
grounds, including picking olives during the fall semester. Most students live in
one of the five villas on the Villa La Pietra campus. The majority of their classes
are held in Villa Ulivi, when they are not held on-site at the Uffizi museum or
another Florentine landmark. For students enrolled in a select number of art
history classes, class takes place in a room at the very top of the main villa, Villa
La Pietra. Entering through the Villa’s chapel, and past a portrait of the former
lady of the Villa, the American expatriate and Florentine transplant Hortense
Mitchell Acton, students ascend to their classrooms.
Tuscan yellow, framed by green shutters, Villa La Pietra itself currently stands
as a monument to a family, the Actons, their art collection, and the fantastical
life they created for themselves during a tumultuous twentieth century. Today
a house museum, Villa La Pietra has been painstakingly restored by NYU to its
glory days when the Actons lived and entertained there. Filled to the brim with
early Italian Renaissance primitivi work, baroque furniture, sculptures from
classical antiquity, and exemplary objects from the Far East, alongside family
portraits from the early twentieth century, Villa La Pietra’s hushed museum at-
mosphere belies the activity of visual communication occurring between these
artworks’ themes and motifs.3
But who was the true architect of this visual communication? What is the
true provenance of this early twentieth century vision of art, culture, and life
under the Tuscan sun?
2 For details of the NYU Florence program’s course offerings and the number of students,
see NYU Florence, N.Y.U. Off. of Glob. Programs, http://www.nyu.edu/global/global-
academic-centers/florence.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014); see also NYU Florence Course List
for 2014, N.Y.U. Off. of Glob. Programs, http://www.nyu.edu/global/global-academic-
centers/florence/academics/courses-spring-2014.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
3 Villa La Pietra is defined by layers of history, which are all unified within its very architecture.
The Actons harnessed and utilized all parts of the Villa’s history in their presentation of the Villa
for themselves, their friends, and fellow visiting expatriates and dignitaries whom they hosted. The
Villa had its genesis as the home of Francesco Sassetti, the banker of the Medici family, from 1460
to 1545. Its resulting Renaissance architecture, with rooms built around a courtyard on a main axis
extending through the house to the gardens, are key elements of the Villa’s Acton era interior deco-
ration. Tapestries and ceramics depicting the Medici coat of arms are dispersed throughout the art
collection. Later owners of the Villa (the Capponi family from 1545 to 1877) tweaked the Villa and
its architecture, notably enclosing the courtyard with a glass ceiling. The Villa’s Acton era decoration
takes advantage of this too. With a fountain complete with fish in the middle, and frescoes bought
and placed along the winding staircase, the indoor courtyard is another testament to how the place-
ment of the Villa’s art collection complements the Villa’s organic, changing historical nature. Like
the Villa’s precise indoor decoration, the Villa’s gardens, complete with an outdoor teatrino, sculpted
through precisely groomed hedges, and peppered with statuary, resurrect a traditional Italian Renais-
sance aesthetic as interpreted through the distinct perspective of a twentieth century American expa-
triate revival. See generally Villa La Pietra: The Acton Collection, N.Y.U. Off. of Glob. Programs,
http://www.nyu.edu/global/lapietra/art.collection/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2015); Villa
La Pietra: Garden, N.Y.U. Off. of Glob. Programs, http://www.nyu.edu/global/lapietra/
garden/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2015). For detailed information on Villa La Pietra during the Acton
era, including the aforementioned dates and architectural information, see Transatlantic Moder-
nities, VLP Collections, http://vlpcollections.org/transatlantic/ (last visited Mar. 14,
2015).
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B Villa La Pietra’s Current Relationship with
the Florentine and American Expatriate Communities
For the tourist abroad, Florence is an idyllic Renaissance town caught in a time
warp, with cobblestones that seem to bear the footprint of Dante himself. To this
day, Florence embodies that age-old Italian adage, “Tutto il mondo è paese” to
its many residents.4 Florence, for all its Renaissance glory, is a small town, where
news travels fast, and everyone seems to know each other. In the early twentieth
century, this was even more so. Scholars have noted that early twentieth century
Florence was a welcome respite from modern civilization, a place of nostalgia.5
The tight-knit group of American expatriates living in Florence interacted with a
select number of Florentines who shared their vision. They had their own news-
papers, among them the Florentine Herald and the Florentine Gazette. These
newspapers did more than simply profile places to visit in Florence and recount
the pleasures of the local English Café Doney’s on Via Tornabuoni; they also
published a “List of Residents” in Florence, and their visitors.6 Anglo-American
residents would visit the art of great Florentine collectors, such as Frederick Stib-
bert, meet for tea at their villas to discuss society news and lofty subjects, and
welcome dignitaries at their exclusive clubs.7
The calm surface and presentation of this nostalgic life, however, was not
just a result of the inherent beauty of Florence and its residents’ observations.8
Indeed, it was the result of a deliberate construction. Art and antiquities dealers,
long before the 1970 UNESCO Convention prohibited their actions, traded on
this romance to sell and sometimes smuggle works of great cultural importance
out of Italy. One need only read the letters of the famed art historian and dealer
Bernard Berenson to Isabella Stewart Gardner to understand the delicate dance
and unbridled enthusiasm inherent to the relationship between dealers and their
4 This phrase translates to “The whole world is a village.”
5 Bernd Roeck, Florence 1900: The Quest for Arcadia 4–5 (Stewart Spencer trans., Yale
University Press 2009) (2001).
6 I have made an in-depth study of these newspapers, which may be found in the archives of the
British Institute of Florence, the Biblioteca Marucelliana, and the Biblioteca Nazionale in Florence.
It is important to note that the Actons’ residence at Villa La Pietra was included in the residents of
Florence, and was spotlighted in articles. The importance of the dates of these notices will be impor-
tant later to the factual inquiry of the paternity suit and inheritance claim by Liana Beacci against
NYU. The first evidence of the Actons’ residence at Villa La Pietra is in a “List of Residents.” List
of British and American Residents in Florence, Florence Herald, Dec. 3, 1908, at 5 [hereinafter
List of Residents]. Prior to his residence at Villa La Pietra, Arthur Acton, referred to as Mr. Acton,
is listed in 1895 as residing at 8 Via Caracciolo. List of Residents, Italian Gazette & Florence
Gazette, Mar. 30, 1895, at 9. Photo Albums in the La Pietra archive contain images, with notations
by Hortense, of a building on the Via Caracciolo, as well as visits to other Villas in the Florentine
countryside, prior to any photographic documentation of Villa La Pietra.
7 One such club to which Arthur Acton belonged was the Florence Club. In and Out of Flo-
rence, Florence Herald, Dec. 6, 1913, at 4 (“British ambassador in Florence, en route to Rome,
entertained by the Florence Club . . . Arthur Acton among gentlemen present.”).
8 As the representation of a prototypical British woman enchanted by Italy, Eleanor Lavish says
in Ruth Jhabvala’s screenplay of A Room with a View, “there is something in the Italian landscape
which inclines even the most stolid nature to romance.” Ruth Prawer Jhabvala, Screenplay to A
Room with a View, Daily Script 40, http://www.dailyscript.com/scripts/A_Room_With_A_
View.pdf (last visited July 27, 2015); A Room with a View (Merchant Ivory Prods. 1985).
2015] Caponigri: Who Owns Villa La Pietra? 205
American clientele.9Homes were not only places of personal rest, but also calling
cards—the proper interior decoration and art collection communicated an un-
derstanding of the Florentine dream. The proper attire and creativity in fashion
and dress could prompt a long sought-after invitation to a fancy-dress ball. Per-
sonal, intimate details of an Anglo-American expatriate life were often hidden
away, not to threaten the foundation of the Anglo-American dream of Florence.
This same calm surface and presentation of nostalgia is visible today at Villa
La Pietra. Apart from hosting NYU’s study-abroad program, the Villa hosts con-
ferences, academic lectures, and political figures.10 It also blends modern luxury
with its own historic grandeur.11 However, like the nostalgic dream of early
twentieth century Florence created by its Anglo-American residents, the surface
of NYU’s La Pietra is also constructed; it is a construction of calm in the face
of a declaration of paternity lawsuit, and a claim of inheritance, both of which
threaten NYU’s very ownership of Villa La Pietra.
C Litigation
In 1994, Harold Acton (“Harold”)—son of Hortense Mitchell Acton (“Hort-
ense”), a banking heiress fromChicago, Illinois—and Arthur Acton (“Acton”)—
an English art dealer and agent of Stanford White—passed away at Villa La
Pietra. Declared the prototypical aesthete of the 1920s by the New York Times,
“his family’s Renaissance villa on a hillside overlooking Florence” was donated
to NYU.12 Almost as soon as the donation occurred, NYU was sued and named
9 For excerpts of the correspondence of Isabella Stewart Gardner and Bernard Berenson, see
generally Louise Hall Tharp, Mrs. Jack: A Biography of Isabella Stewart Gardner (1965).
Isabella writes, “I am bitten by the Rembrandt and today being Sunday I will cable ‘Yes Rembrandt,
Yes Tintoretto.’ ” Ernest Samuels, Bernard Berenson: The Making of a Connoisseur 244
(1979).
10 In 1999, President Bill Clinton stayed at the Villa prior to the Conference on Progressive Gov-
ernance for the 21st Century. See William J. Clinton, Remarks at a Dinner for the Conference on
Progressive Governance for the 21st Century in Florence, Italy, in 2 Public Papers of the Presi-
dents of the United States: William J. Clinton 2127, 2127–31 (2000).
11 The Villa hosted a Louis Vuitton collection launch party, displaying items of the new
Louis Vuitton collection alongside Hortense Mitchell Acton’s personally engraved Louis Vuitton
trunks from the late nineteenth century in 2004. Portfolio: Louis Vuitton, Smart& R Associati,
http://www.smart-er.it/dettaglio-progetti.php?id=51 (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
12 John Darnton, Sir Harold Acton Is Dead at 89; Prototypic Esthete of the 1920’s, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 1, 1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/03/01/obituaries/sir-harold-acton-
is-dead-at-89-prototypic-esthete-of-the-1920-s.html; see also The Talk of the Town,
New Yorker, Oct. 30, 1995 at 33; Judy Bachrach, Florentine Mischief, Vanity Fair, Dec. 2003,
at 258. In reality, Harold Acton’s American will, which postdated his Italian Last Will and Testa-
ment, left all his shares in the La Pietra Corporation, which holds the title to Villa La Pietra, to NYU.
Last Will and Testament of Harold Acton, at 2 (Dec. 28, 1993) (on file with author). It is important
here to note that the full estate of Harold Acton included not only Villa La Pietra, the art collection
in the Villa, the fifty-seven acres and surrounding Villas, but also the first two floors of the Palazzo
Lanfredini in downtown Florence, in which The British Institute of Florence is currently located.
This Note considers only colorable claims to Villa La Pietra itself, not the art collection within, to
the Palazzo Lanfredini, nor to any other Villa on the property. This Note also only considers the
defendant NYU and their arguments in the case, and not the British Institute, or Avv. Andrea Scav-
etta, the executor of Harold Acton’s estate. It is also important to note here, as an aside in the case,
that if NYU cannot fulfill the wishes of Harold Acton’s last will and testament, namely to maintain
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in 1995 as the defendant in a declaration of paternity suit filed by an Italian
woman in her seventies, Liana Beacci (“Beacci”).13 Being the daughter of Elsie
Beacci (“Elsie”), who had been Acton’s secretary, Beacci’s petition for a legal
declaration that Arthur Acton was her father was and still is a necessary precon-
dition to any claim of right under Italy’s generous inheritance laws.14 First filed
in 1995, the declaration of paternity suit is still being litigated in Italian courts as
of this writing, notwithstanding Beacci’s death in 2000 at age 83.15 Apart from
Italy’s notoriously slow judicial system, the case has raised new issues of Italian
law, allowing it to continue rather than die a legal death. One of the most im-
portant of these issues recently brought the parties to the Corte di Cassazione,
Italy’s supreme court. This issue is whether NYU was properly named as the
defendant in the suit for declaration of paternity when Article 276 of the Italian
Civil Code (or “C.c.”), at the time the case was brought, only allowed people
to sue their presumed parents or those parents’ heirs—and not the heirs of the
heirs—to obtain judicial recognition of their status as biological children.16 This
issue has been made more complex by the Italian Parliament’s passage in 2012
of the filiazione reform, which revised Article 276.17 As of February 7, 2014,
in the case of the absence of both the presumed parent and his heirs, a person
seeking a declaration of paternity now has the right to present the claim in front
of a curatore speciale appointed by the judge.18
Villa La Pietra “for the study and development of the arts,” the Villa will go to the Art Institute of
Chicago. Id. at 4.
13 The Talk of the Town, supra note 12, at 34.
14 Antonio Tullio, La successione necessaria 140 (2012).
15 Anthony Haden-Guest, A Family Affair: New York University and the Acton Saga, N.Y. Ob-
server (Sept. 10, 2013, 5:42 PM), http://galleristny.com/2013/09/a-family-affair-new-
york-university-and-the-acton-saga/.
16 Codice Civile [C.c.] [Civil Code] art. 276 (1969). It is important to note here that the
Italian code at the time used the term naturale to refer to children born outside of marriage. Here,
the Note will use the English word “biological” for the Italian naturale.
17 Legge 10 dicembre 2012, n. 219, G.U. Dec. 17, 2012, n. 293. Filiazione means “filiation”,
and refers to the status of being a child of a parent. Throughout the Note, the word filiazione will
be used in place of “filiation.”
18 The only comprehensive book in English on the Italian Code of Civil Procedure translates
curatore speciale as “special trustee.” Simona Grossi & Maria Cristina Pagni, Commentary
on the Italian Code of Civil Procedure 135–36 (2010). Because of the close relationship in
this case between Article 78 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure and Article 276 of the Civil
Code, hereinafter, when used, “special trustee” means curatore speciale in Italian law. Other legal
scholarship alternatively translates curatore speciale literally, substituting the word “special curator”
in English, defining it as a “special curator, curatore speciale, who shares decision-making power
with the guardian.” Nicholas A. Secara, Note, Has Italy Discovered Virgil? Utilizing the British
Archetype to Create End-of-Life Legislation in Italy, 19 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 127, 160
(2011) (quoting John Griffiths, Heleen Weyers & Maurice Adams, Euthanasia and Law in
Europe 412 (2008)) (discussing the appointment of a curatore speciale to share power with a father
who, as his daughter’s guardian, wanted to withdraw medical treatment since she was in a coma).
The exact language of the revised Article 276, entitled Legittimazione passiva is:
La domanda per la dichiarazione di paternità o di maternità naturale deve essere
proposta nei confronti del presunto genitore o, in sua mancanza, nei confronti dei
suoi eredi. In loro mancanza, la domanda deve essere proposta nei confronti di un
curatore nominato dal giudice davanti al quale il giudizio deve essere promosso. Alla
domanda può contraddire chiunque vi abbia interesse.
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In their judicial opinions, both the Tribunale—the Court of First Instance—
and the Corte d’Apello—the Court of Appeals—have claimed that principles
found in the Italian Constitution (“Constitution”), justify denying a person legal
recourse to seek the status of a legally recognized child. These principles are the
protection of the legitimate family in Article 30 and the delegation of discretion
to the legislature to promulgate rules regarding the ascertainment of paternity
in Article 29.19 Most recently, however, in a judgment deposited in September
2014, the Corte di Cassazione has ruled that, according to both the principles of
equality and fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution
as well as the legislative intent of the filiazione reform, the Beaccis do indeed have
legal recourse, allowing the Beaccis to seek the declaration of the status of Liana
Beacci as a legally recognized child.20
The legal recognition of Beacci as the biological child of Acton goes hand in
hand with the second issue in the case: whether Beacci and her heirs may suc-
cessfully claim inheritance rights to Villa La Pietra. A Beacci inheritance claim
cannot even be considered without Beacci first obtaining the status of a recog-
nized biological child.21
The purpose of this Note is to examinewhetherNYU can claim thatHortense
remained the sole owner of Villa La Pietra and therefore that she bequeathed
Villa La Pietra to her son, Harold, fully and without any colorable claims by
her husband’s natural offspring, Beacci.22 There are three applications of Italian
law under which NYU could have and could still indeed successfully claim this,
and one application of Italian law under which they could not. This Note will
examine these four scenarios, in the following order:
1. NYU might have successfully claimed that NYU was not the proper de-
fendant in the case, thereby precluding Beacci’s heirs from bringing their
inheritance claim;
2. NYU successfully claims Hortense was given Villa La Pietra by her father,
the millionaire Chicago banker William Mitchell, thereby retaining sole
title to the Villa as her personal property, and therefore bequeathing clear
title to her son Harold, and then to NYU;
C.c. art. 276. The law passed that caused the filiazione reform to enter into force was Decreto Legge,
28 dicembre 2013, n. 154., G.U. Dec. 10, 2012, n. 219.
19 Art. 29 Costituzione [Cost.]; Art. 30 Cost.
20 Si riapre la battaglia per l’eredità di sir Acton [Reopening the Battle for the Legacy of Sir
Acton], La Repubblica.it: Firenze (Sept. 24, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://firenze.repubblica.
it/cronaca/2014/09/24/news/si_riapre_la_battaglia_per_l_eredit_di_sir_acton-
96545717/; see also Cass., sez. I, 19 settembre 2014, n. 19790, Foro it. 2015, I, 2126.
21 Tullio, supra note 14. It is important to note here that, by applying the Italian laws of suc-
cession and inheritance to the facts of the case, this Note dives into a hypothetical and theoretical
application, since the actual parties have not even arrived at litigating this issue in their real-life legal
action.
22 And as a result, whether NYU might itself retain good title to Villa La Pietra and not risk any
threat to the existence of its study abroad program and campus.
208 Notre Dame J. Int’l & Comp. L. [vol. 5:1
3. NYU successfully claims Hortense set up a legal entity, whether a corpo-
ration or trust, placing legal title to Villa La Pietra in such entity, thereby
bequeathing clear title to her son Harold, and then NYU; and
4. Hortense and Acton acquired the Villa together, thereby resulting in a col-
orable claim by Liana Beacci to Villa La Pietra and the property.
Before presenting these scenarios, this Note will set forth the facts of the case
as each party to the case has presented them. It will then review the procedural
posture of the Beacci v. NYU case. Finally, it will situate Italian inheritance law
within the greater historical context of Italian family law and its many incarna-
tions and reforms.23
At the heart of this legal battle and these different scenarios is a great, as yet
unfound, balance between the protection of a fundamental facet of a person’s
identity: their paternity, their knowledge of who they are and where they come
from, and the protection of the legacy of a villa and a family, and the rights of the
curator of that legacy, NYU. The quest to find this balance frames and informs
the Note’s analysis.
II Facts
Both parties generally accept the following facts: Hortense Mitchell, a Chicago
heiress, and Arthur Acton, an agent of Stanford White in Florence, married in
1903.24 In 1907, Villa La Pietra was purchased. Hortense and Acton resided at
Villa La Pietra after this date. Sometime before 1917, Elsie Beacci came to work
at the Villa and sometime thereafter, left her employment at the Villa. Hort-
ense and Arthur Acton had two children, Harold, born in 1904, and William,
born in 1906. Elsie had one daughter, Liana, born in 1917. It is in painting the
composition within this factual frame that differences begin to emerge.
A The Beaccis
Elsie’s collected diary entries are the main source of the Beaccis’ facts. Beacci’s
daughter, Dialta Alliata-Lensi Orlandi (“Dialta”), has published an edited ver-
sion of these letters in book form. The book is entitled My Mother, My Father
and His Wife Hortense. According to this version of the facts, Elsie met Arthur
Acton in 1897, when she was working in a doctor’s office in Florence.25 On
23 Contextualizing the law historically is especially important for this case, because Italian law
will apply the rules of succession from the 1942 Civil Code, without its revisions up to the present
day, to Arthur Acton’s estate.
24 An architect whose works included Madison Square Garden, Stanford White also procured
Italian antiquities through contacts on the ground in Italy, like Arthur Acton, for his many million-
aire American clients. A talented, yet scandalous figure, White’s death was one of the inspirations for
E.L. Doctorow’s Ragtime. White was shot and killed in 1906 in the garden terrace on top of Madi-
son Square Garden by Harry Kendall Thaw, the husband of one of White’s former lovers, Evelyn
Nesbit. For a description of White’s activity in the antiquities market, see generally Wayne Craven,
Stanford White: Decorator in Opulence and Dealer in Antiquities (2005).
25 Dialta Alliata-Lensi Orlandi, My Mother, My Father, and His Wife Hortense 46
(2013).
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March 15, 1897, Arthur took Elsie to see Villa La Pietra, which at the time was
in “a state of abandonment.”26 After declarations by Arthur that La Pietra was
his mission, and that he was meant to restore it, collect art there, and “create a
lasting bastion of classic Florentine vision and grace,” Arthur asked Elsie to ac-
company him on this mission to “manage things and be sufficiently independent
to handle my affairs when I am away.”27 On August 1, 1897, Elsie wrote that
Arthur had “rented the property for next to nothing in exchange for taking care
of it and with a written intent from the owner that the tiny payment and the
expenses for the renovation will go towards the eventual purchase price. He is
intending to purchase the Villa one day.”28 According to diary entries published
in this book, Elsie did manage Villa La Pietra. She installed artwork, even after
Arthur and Hortense married, placed statues in the garden, and managed the
workers who helped to restore the Villa.29 In the book, both the Villa and the
art collection are presented as the result of the creative spark of Arthur and Elsie,
as the physical embodiment of their hidden love.30 According to the same, Elsie
only departed La Pietra in 1916 when she was expecting her daughter, Liana.
Shortly after this departure, Elsie wrote that Acton placed La Pietra and the rest
of the villas in the complex in Hortense’s name in order to avoid paying Italian
taxes.31 Moreover, according to this same account, Acton bought all the villas
on the property, including La Pietra, himself, and gave La Pietra in 1907 “to
Hortense as a present for the birth of the boys.”32 For the rest of her life, Elsie
ran the Pensione Beacci-Tornabuoni on the Via Tornabuoni in Florence’s centro
storico.
For her part, Elsie’s daughter Liana was educated in the best schools in Eng-
land and Switzerland and “was a frequent guest” at the Villa.33 Arthur Acton
also painted many portraits of Liana and her mother, which the Beacci family
has in their possession.34 Beacci’s relationship with Acton is portrayed as one of
silence and ignorant bliss, in which neither can admit to the other nor discuss
that they are father and daughter, and yet they act, in private, as if they were.
Moreover, Beacci’s interactions were not limited to Acton, but extended to her
half-brother William, with whom she apparently had a very close relationship.35
Notwithstanding these happy entries, which include detailed accounts of
Elsie’s romantic interludes with Acton in all their physicality, Elsie’s diary goes to
great lengths to portray Hortense as an alcoholic, a drunk, and as a woman who
had no comprehension of her husband Arthur’s interest in art, and no interest
26 Id. at 62.
27 Id. at 62–63.
28 Id. at 75.
29 Id. at 102–03.
30 For example, a reference to “our garden rooms” and a tryst amongst statues. Id. at 171.
31 Id. at 244. Please note that a history and examination of Italian tax law is beyond the scope
of this Note.
32 Id. at 243.
33 The Talk of the Town, supra note 12, at 34.
34 See id.; Bachrach, supra note 12, at 280.
35 Alliata-Lensi Orlandi, supra note 25, at 284.
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in his vision for La Pietra.36 Many scenes are written in which Hortense at once
complains, “I miss my life, . . . I miss Lake Geneva, I miss our house,” and alter-
natively, “[a]ll these old things mean nothing to me . . . [t]hey are just objects.”37
Elsie is portrayed as the interpreter who unlocks Florence for Hortense, and as
Hortense’s only friend. One of the most detailed passages concerns the marriage
of Louise Dillingham, Hortense’s cousin, which took place at Villa La Pietra in
1910. According to the Beacci account, Hortense received word that her father
died that very day, and everyone wore black to the wedding.38 Hortense is also
said to be absent from Florence and the Villa for a whole year during World
War I, from 1915 to 1916.39
All of these details cumulate in a portrait of Hortense as a weak, childish
woman with no understanding of her surroundings. Hortense’s outbursts, espe-
cially those directed at Elsie as she confronts Acton about the affair, are por-
trayed as immature rather than as the justified concerns of a wronged wife. She
is portrayed as drinking martinis until in a drunken stupor as she lies around
the Villa in Chinese silks.40 The book ends with the revelation that Acton was
himself illegitimate, completing the narrative circle irrevocably linking him with
his own daughter.
Liana Beacci married and had five children. She lived with her husband in
Italy, close to Florence.41 She and Acton continued to speak and enjoyed a con-
vivial relationship. In 1952, according to Beacci, Acton called her to the Villa,
stood her next toHarold and told her to “rely onHarold, whowould take care of
me as he himself [Acton] had always done.”42 Acton further said “Harold would
manage La Pietra as long as Harold lived, and that in the event that Harold died
without heirs, Acton’s wish was for the estate to be inherited by my five children
and me.”43 This was the last time Beacci saw Acton.
B The Actons44
As previously observed, much of Dialta’s book centers on her grandmother play-
ing the heroine to Hortense’s wicked wife, and her mother playing the stoic vic-
tim to Hortense’s reign of terror.45 The facts show, however, that far from a
stereotypical drunk housewife who was ignorant of the beauty around her, Hort-
36 Id. at 212, 220, 260–63, 310, 316–19.
37 Id. at 192–93.
38 Id. at 204–05.
39 Id. at 233.
40 Id. at 383.
41 Id. at 322.
42 Id. at 363.
43 Id. at 363–64.
44 Portions of these facts were discovered while researching my undergraduate thesis. Felicia
Caponigri, Hortense Mitchell Acton: From Fashion Collector to Art Collector (Apr. 2012) (unpub-
lished undergraduate thesis, University of Notre Dame) (on file with author). My undergraduate
thesis has been used to create a portion of Villa La Pietra’s online exhibit, Transatlantic Moder-
nities. See Hortense’s Dress, Transatlantic Modernities, http://www.vlpcollections.org/
transatlanticmodernities/hortenses-dress/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
45 Alliata-Lensi Orlandi, supra note 25, at 304–05; see also supra Section II.A.
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ense Mitchell Acton was a woman of refined taste, with a sense of adventure,
who had a knack for socializing in early twentieth century Florence.
Prior to her arrival in Florence, Hortense played her own part in a success-
ful Chicago family. Her father, William Mitchell, was a self-made millionaire
who, as a youth, kept the company of California gold miners before found-
ing the Alton Railway in Illinois. After the Great Fire in 1872, he tempted his
fate in Chicago, and was offered the presidency of the Illinois Trust and Sav-
ings Bank.46 Hortense had just been born. In the many profiles of her brother,
the multi-millionaire John J. Mitchell, who succeeded his father as President of
the Illinois Savings and Trust, Hortense’s family and their work ethic were de-
scribed as “humble” and “democratic.”47 Collecting ran in Hortense’s family.
Her brother John bought a summer home made out of the Ceylon (modern Sri
Lanka) building built to represent that country and its culture from the famous
World’s Columbian Exposition of 1893 on Lake Geneva in Wisconsin.48 Hort-
ense’s older sister, Mrs. (Mary) Chauncey J. Blair, was also a collector and was
one of the founding members of the Antiquarian Society at the Art Institute of
Chicago, donating multiple pieces of decorative arts to the Art Institute.49 Co-
incidentally, Mary’s home in Chicago was designed in the model of an Italian
Renaissance villa, and she took up residence at it prior to 1901, before Hortense
married Arthur Acton.50
Before meeting Acton (presumably while on holiday in Egypt), Hortense
graduated fromDearborn Seminary in Chicago and went on to study in Berlin.51
She was also a regular on the Chicago social scene. Not much is known about
Acton prior to his arrival in Florence, although multiple facts point to his train-
ing as an artist at the Academie des Beaux-Arts in Paris, where some specu-
late he met Hortense’s brother, Guy Mitchell.52 An agent of Stanford White’s in
Florence for certain, Acton is quoted in the American press shortly after Stan-
ford White’s death, defending his late friend’s name and honor.53 Mentioned by
46 See William H. Mitchell Dies, Chi. Daily Trib., Mar. 9, 1910, at 4.
47 See One of the Nation’s Leading Financiers, Chi. Daily Trib., May 24, 1901, at 11.
48 Hortense visited the home multiple times. A photograph of John’s summer home can be found
in the photo archives of Villa La Pietra. Likewise, images of the Ceylon Building from the World’s
Colombian Exposition confirm that John’s home is the same building. Carolyn Hope Smeltzer &
Martha Kiefer Cucco, Lake Geneva in Vintage Postcards 25 (2005).
49 Membership in such societies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries marked the
movement of nineteenth century women from the inner sphere of their homes into the public sphere.
The Antiquarian Society at the Art Institute soon became a force to be reckoned with, seeking dona-
tions from Chicago’s elite. For more information on the Society, see Celia Hilliard, “Higher Things”:
Remembering the Early Antiquarians, Museum Stud., Fall 2002, at 6.
50 For information on Mary’s home, see Herma Clark’s Letter, Chi. Daily Trib., Feb. 20, 1949.
51 Judith Cass,Dearborn Seminary Alumnae AssociationMeets, Chi. Daily Trib., Jan. 18, 1933,
at 15 (for list of Dearborn Alumni); Passport Application of Hortense Mitchell Acton to Consulate
of the United States in Berlin (Sept. 28, 1889) (on file with author); In The SocietyWorld, Chi. Daily
Trib., Oct. 11, 1902, at 13 (describing Hortense’s intent to winter in Egypt with her brother Guy
and their mother).
52 See generally R. Terry Schnadelbach, Hidden Lives/Secret Gardens: The Florentine
Villas Gamberia, La Pietra, and I Tatti (2009) (commenting on Acton’s years in Paris).
53 Arthur Acton was quoted defending Stanford White’s honor after his death: “[A]rtists intend
to stand by Mr. White’s memory and protect it as far as possible from the calumny which the other
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Bernard Berenson to Isabella Stewart Gardner as a “bounder” (a less than flat-
tering term), Acton seemed to always be considered a collector of bric-a-brac
by his fellow Anglo-Americans expatriates and Florentine art collectors, while
American visitors were usually enthused about seeing his collection.54 It is still
uncertain whether Arthur Acton was related to the famous noble English Actons
who then made their home in Naples.55
When she moved to Florence in 1904 with Arthur, one of the first things
Hortense did was establish relationships with leading art collectors of the day.
That same year she visited the Oriental collection of Frederick Stibbert, and
wrote him a letter thanking him for lending her a book on Chinese costume,
which she would use as inspiration for a dress to wear at an upcoming ball.56
Far from frivolity or simple weirdness, Hortense’s chinoiserie robes and kimonos
that she is reported to have worn later in life were an extension of her early Ori-
entalist taste, a commonality she shared with celebrated Florentines. Hortense’s
Orientalist taste was, in the early twentieth century, an expression of cultural
colonialism, through which members of the Anglo-American and Florentine elite
understood other cultures. In fact, Anglo-Americans understood and mediated
their relationship this way not only with the Orient, but also with Italians and
Florence itself. It is this mediation in which Hortense engaged when she dressed
up in a Paul Poiret costume alongside her husband and danced the night away as
an Arabian princess at a Venetianmasquerade ball at the American ambassador’s
Villa Schifanoia in 1914.57
Through her fashion and her aesthetic taste, Hortense created social relation-
ships that benefited Arthur Acton, their life at Villa La Pietra, and the art collect-
ing done there. Before his marriage to Hortense, notwithstanding his supposed
great residence in Florence, there is barely a mention of Acton in the Anglo-
Florentine newspapers of the time.58 Instead, once he married Hortense, Arthur
began to not only appear in the society columns, but also to be noticed, although
perhaps not completely admired, for his art collection and the gardens of Villa
La Pietra.59
side of the case is trying to heap on it.” Admires Collection: Italian Connoisseur Praises Chas. L.
Freer’s Paintings, Detroit Free Press, Sept. 7, 1906, at 5. In retrospect, these words seem rather
prophetic, given the calumny the Beacci claim is heaping on the Acton memory.
54 Schnadelbach, supra note 52, at 92 (for details of Berenson’s letter); Letter from Pauline
Kohlsaat Palmer, in The Letters of Pauline Palmer 190 (Elanor Dwight ed., 2006) (detailing the
excitement Chicago friends felt at the chance to see some “real antiquities” upon visiting Hortense
and Acton at Villa La Pietra for Louise Dillingham’s wedding).
55 Harold has described his father as an orphan. Harold Acton, More Memoirs of an Aes-
thete 321 (Faber & Faber 2008) (1970).
56 HortenseM. Acton, Thank You Letter to Frederick Stibbert (1904) (on file withMuseo Stibbert
Archive, Florence, Italy).
57 Social Intelligence, Florence Herald, Mar. 28, 1914 (on file with Biblioteca Marucelliana
in Florence, Italy).
58 List of Residents, supra note 6.
59 See, e.g., The Tuscan Villas as Home rather than as Show-places, ItalianMail, Jan. 27, 1923.
In a review of an upcoming book in which it was featured, the newspaper commented on Villa La
Pietra and its owners, noting they “ha[d] allowed the genius loci of the whole house to come forth
as part of the garden.” Id.
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According to multiple sources, the title of Villa La Pietra was always in Hort-
ense’s name, and never in Arthur’s.60 Photographs located in the Villa La Pietra
Photographic Archive show that, far from wearing black, everyone at the 1910
wedding at La Pietra wore white or a similarly light color.61 Likewise, the Beacci
diaries date the wedding as May 3, 1910, while William Mitchell’s obituary in
the Chicago Daily Tribune is dated March 9, 1910.
While there is indeed a lack of society news about Hortense in the years
when the Beaccis claim she was out of Italy, the year leading up to it, 1914,
displays one of Hortense’s most active social calendars. In the span of onemonth,
Hortense was dubbed the hostess of the week. She attended receptions and picnic
luncheons, a New Year’s Daymusicale, where she apparently very much enjoyed
the tango alongside Acton, and dressed William and Harold up in authentic
Chinese garb for a Children’s Fancy Dress Cotillion.62 WhenHortense did travel,
Acton often came with her, and these departures, like their parties, were noted in
the society pages. After World War II and the loss of her son, William, Hortense
kept to herself at the Villa, reading books and entertaining guests until her death
in 1962. Arthur predeceased her in 1953.
Accounts of Harold’s relationship with his parents have said that it was
strained, with Harold himself admitting that his parents preferred William.63
These articles (published in respectable names such as The New Yorker and Van-
ity Fair) have gone so far as to state that Harold complained to Bernard Beren-
son about these parent-child issues. However, in his memoirs, Harold spoke
60 Not only do the Beaccis admit this in the published letters, but multiple people interviewed for
this Note have confirmed that title to the property was indeed in Hortense’s name. So far, this Author
has been unable to obtain the exact title from the Pubblico Registro Conservatorio in Florence,
although a contract registered in 1930 located in the Archivio Storico of the Comune di Firenze
names Hortense as the sole owner of land on Via Bolognese. “Acton Hortense. Cessione di terreno
in via Bolognese” fra villa Ruspoli e villa La Pietra di proprietà della medesima, (1928–1929) (on
file with Archivio Storico of the Comune di Firenze).
61 For a photograph of the 1910 wedding, see A. Richard Turner, La Pierta: Florence, A
Family, and a Villa 62 (2002).
62 For details of Hortense’s social outings in these months see Social Intelligence, Florence Her-
ald, Jan. 31, 1914 (“Mrs. A Acton one of the hostesses of the week”); Social Intelligence, Florence
Herald, Jan. 17, 1914 (“Mr and Mrs A Acton at picnic luncheon arranged last week at the Mem-
ber’s Club House at San Donato”); Social Intelligence, Florence Herald, Jan. 10, 1914 (“Mr and
Mrs Acton attended the ‘Supper Tango’ at the Grand Hotel on December 31st”); Social Intelligence,
Florence Herald, Jan. 3, 1914 (“we noted Mrs A Acton’s little boys—a most authentic pair of
Chinese—a mandarin in pink and a coolie in sky blue satin”). All articles are on file with Biblioteca
Marucelliana and Biblioteca Nazionale in Florence, Italy. Social Intelligence and In and Out of Flo-
rence were regular columns on page four of The Florence Herald. Many of Hortense’s social events
still occurred during World War I, with notations, especially of her dining with officers of the British
army, who were also guests at her home, prevalent in The Florence Herald.
Hortense was very active in the Red Cross, and she attended and helped to organize many of
their charitable functions, which was also duly noted in the Anglo-Florentine press. In and Out of
Florence, Florence Herald & Italian Gazette, Nov. 27, 1915, at 3 (noting Hortense and officers
staying at Villa La Pietra attended a musical entertainment at Villa Medici for the Red Cross). More-
over, at the height of World War I, Hortense participated in the Umberto Brunelleschi costumed pro-
duction Un po di colore. See Villa La Pietra: Treasures from Hortense Mitchell’s Wardrobe, N.Y.U.
Off. of Glob. Programs, http://www.nyu.edu/global/lapietra/pdfs/Hortense%20Dress%
20Display%20Brochure_Web.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2015).
63 Acton, supra note 55, at 189.
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with frankness about his relationships, but never revealed any ugliness which
may have colored them.64 Indeed, by all accounts, Harold’s closest friends have
noted how he felt very much his mother’s presence at the Villa even after her
death in 1962. A graduate of Oxford, a writer, an expatriate in China during
the 1930s, and finally the last aesthete of his time and host at Villa La Pietra,
Harold’s dedication to Villa La Pietra and his Orientalist aesthetic were also very
much a reflection of his own brand of cultural colonialism. Before the death of
his mother in 1962, Harold writes in his memoirs that it was she who convinced
him of the legacy of Villa La Pietra.65
Although there is no mention in Harold’s books, or any evidence in Villa La
Pietra’s photographic archive of Beacci or her mother Elsie, Harold is said to
have known about Beacci and to have avoided her at parties in public when he
could.66
III Procedural Posture
A Round 1: Admissibility:
Primo Grado—Tribunale, Secondo Grado—Appello, Cassazione
1995–199867
On July 21, 1995, Liana Beacci filed suit against New York University, which
inherited all of Harold Acton’s shares in the La Pietra Corporation, which held
title to Villa La Pietra. Article 274 of the Italian Civil Code provided the grounds
for Beacci’s suit: It was an action for the admissibility of Beacci’s claim for dec-
laration of paternity from Sir Arthur Acton.68 The Tribunale of Florence held
that Beacci’s claim was inadmissible, holding proof of an intimate relationship
between Elsie Beacci and Arthur Acton was lacking. Appealing the case to the
FlorenceCorte d’Appello, Beacci argued that theTribunale erroneously held that
64 These included comments such that his father, “expected my brother and me to live in statu
pupillari under his permanent supervision and control” while his mother “[the] most angelic of
companions . . . her sweetness of temper smoothed over the asperities . . . that cropped up (between
father and son) . . . no doubt she too would have wished me to get married and lead a different life,
but far from reproaching me she encouraged me to be true to myself . . . . I owe everything to her
instinctive understanding.” Id. at 60.
65 Id. at 338.
66 Harold Acton’s reported comments about his supposed half-sister included, “I know nothing
about that woman!” David Plante, A Last Fantasy in Florence, New Yorker, July 10, 1995, at 50.
67 The Italian court system consists of the Primo Grado—the Court of First Instance, called the
Tribunale—the Secondo Grado—the Appeals Court—and the Corte di Cassazione—the Supreme
Court. In Italian civil law, second instance appeals may be made both on procedural and substantive
grounds. On appeal, there is a de novo retrial of all decisions based in law (but not in fact). Parties
may introduce new evidence and new defenses (in extraordinary circumstances), but they may not
introduce new claims. Judgments from the court of first instance which may be appealed include
partial judgments and judgments which completely dismiss a case. The court of appeals decides both
on the procedure and on the merits of a case. In contrast, the Corte di Cassazione may only hear
appeals based on procedural grounds, not on the merits of the case, and may not make a judgment
on the merits. Therefore, the Corte di Cassazione usually sends a case back to the Tribunale for
judgment. For a more detailed summary, see Grossi & Pagni, supra note 18, at 9–23.
68 App., 13 Maggio 2013, n. 738 (Firenze), slip op. at 5.
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there was a lack of proof regarding intimate relations between her mother, Elsie
Beacci, and her presumed father, Arthur Acton, failing in fact to consider other
evidence, including the portraits painted of Liana by Acton, her schooling, the
fact that her mother lived at Villa La Pietra for an extended period of time prior
to Liana’s birth, and other testimony.69 Liana Beacci contested the Tribunale’s
finding on the main legal grounds that it had failed to render a decision based
on the probability of the evidence, and had instead weighed the evidence to a
level of certainty.70 The standard for admissibility of judicial declarations of pa-
ternity actions at that time was that elements offered need not be decisive, but
rather “susceptible to development, integration and in depth analysis in the de-
cision on the merits.”71 Likewise, Beacci also alleged that the Tribunale did not
take advantage of the ability to prove the facts with an eventual DNA test, as re-
quired by Article 116 of the Italian Code of Civil Procedure (or “C.p.c.”).72 NYU
countered this appeal by arguing that the facts proffered were only sufficient
to establish a mere acquaintance between Elsie Beacci and Arthur Acton, and
nothing more (that is, they were not susceptible to development).73 On Febru-
ary 28, 1996, the court of appeals deemed Beacci’s action admissible, agreeing
with Beacci that the Tribunale erred in holding the evidence to a standard of cer-
tainty and not probability. The court came to this conclusion by examining the
legislature’s intent in substituting “specific circumstances” for the word indizi, or
“proof”, as part of the 1975 Family Law Reform. Moreover, the appeals court
held that the proper purpose and end of the Tribunale judge’s investigation was
to ascertain a fumus bonus iuris.74 The court of appeals also took into account
the protective nature and purpose of Article 274 of the Civil Code (as a prelimi-
nary check on the claim for a declaration of paternity). Although justified by the
last clause of Article 30 of the Constitution (“the law shall establish rules and
constraints for the declaration of paternity”), the existence of the Article was
difficult to reconcile with Article 24 of the Constitution (protecting the right of
anyone to bring a case before a court of law in order to protect their rights).
Therefore, the court reasoned that the risk of ordering a potential DNA test to
prove the claim on the merits in the future was minor when balanced within the
nature of the issue: that of close family relationships.75
NYU in turn appealed to the Corte di Cassazione on procedural grounds,
arguing that the reasoning of the Corte d’Appello, which tied these pieces of
69 The facts and reasoning here cited to are taken from Cass., sez. I, 27 febbraio 1997, n. 5371.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. Article 116 of the C.p.c. provides that a judge must evaluate the evidence according to his
judgment unless the law provides otherwise. For a complete and exhaustive list of the articles of the
C.p.c., see Codice di procedura civile: Commentato con la giurisprudenza [Code of Civil
Procedure: Annotated with Jurisprudence] (Francesco Bartolini & Piero Savarro, eds., 33d ed.
2013).
73 Cass., sez. I, 27 febbraio 1997, n. 5371.
74 Fumus bonus iuris is a Roman law term which in Italian law means that a claim has been
found to be sufficiently not manifestedly unfounded, that there is a possibility or a probability of
the existence of the right. Fumus Bonus Iuris, Enciclopedia Treccani, http://www.treccani.
it/enciclopedia/fumus-boni-iuris/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
75 Cass., sez. I, 27 febbraio 1997, n. 5371.
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evidence to the existence of a fumus, was procedurally nonexistent and therefore
contrary to both Article 274, which required the judge tomotivare, that is, justify
or explain his reasoning, and to Article 111 of the Italian Constitution.76
The Corte di Cassazione agreed with the court of appeals that the standard
was a fumus bonus iuris, but also sided with NYU, holding that the judgment of
the court of appeals did indeed lack a sufficient explanation to fulfill the proce-
dural requirement.77 The Corte held that the court of appeals, instead of relying
on a complex evaluation of the facts as offered by Beacci, should have taken it
upon itself to verify the “demonstrative capacity of these dates and their suscep-
tibility to probatory development in a successive judgment on the merits.”78 The
Corte also held that this verification must take place before the court ordered a
DNA test, since if not the purpose of Article 274 (to evaluate the admissibility,
or colorability, of a claim), would be in vain. As a result, on February 27, 1997
the Corte di Cassazione remanded the case to the appeals court in Florence so
the lower court could both complete this verification and explain its reasoning.
On September 14, 1998 the court of appeals in Florence declared Liana
Beacci’s claim for a declaration of paternity admissible. Neither party contested
the decision.
B Round 2: DNA and the Beginnings of
the Curatore Speciale: 2000–2007
On March 31, 1999, after Beacci’s claim was deemed admissible, Liana Beacci
sued New York University on two new grounds. First, she asked that the court
ascertain her status as the biological daughter of Arthur Acton. Second, that her
rights of inheritance relative to her biological father Arthur Acton and the related
issue of her rights of succession as to her biological brother Harold Acton, be
ascertained and consequently declared.79
On August 22, 2000, Liana Beacci passed away.80 On November 22, 2000,
Dialta Lensi Orlandi Cardini, Liana Beacci’s daughter, presented herself at the
Tribunale of Florence, and according to Article 2908 of the Italian Civil Code,
formally replaced her mother as the new plaintiff in the case, continuing the
proceedings.81 Dialta’s children and Liana’s other heirs were later joined to the
case.
On June 6, 2001, NYU moved for an extinction of the proceedings on the
grounds that Beacci’s descendants did not continue the case within six months of
the declaration of death. The Tribunale judge sustained this objection, and sep-
76 Art. 111 Costituzione [Cost.] states, “All judicial decisions shall include a statement of
reasons.”
77 Cass., sez. I, 27 febbraio 1997, n. 5371.
78 Id. (translation by Author).
79 App., 13 maggio 2013, n. 738 (Firenze), slip op. at 9.
80 Id. at 6.
81 Codice Civile [C.c.] art. 2908 provides that a judge may nominate, modify, or extinguish
judicial relationships, having an effect on the parties, their heirs, or those having cause. Codice
civile [C.c.] art. 270 also provides that the right to sue transfers to the natural child’s heirs if they
die during the proceedings.
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arated the cause of action of judicial declaration of paternity from that of suc-
cession, suspending the latter until the declaration of paternity was resolved.82
On February 28, 2002, Liana’s daughter Dialta and her fellow plaintiffs once
again raised issues and claims brought by Liana Beacci in her original 1999
case.83 On January 13, 2003, the judge unified the 1999 case with the action of
Liana Beacci’s children and heirs, and again separated the issues of declaration
of paternity and succession in the continued case. With this same ordinance,
the judge also appointed a Consulente Tecnico d’Ufficio (“CTU”) to effectuate
a DNA examination of Arthur Acton and Liana Beacci and an analysis of the
data, authorizing their exhumations.84
After the DNA test, which ascertained to 99.94% certainty that Liana Beacci
was the natural child of Arthur Acton,85 the results were deposited with the
court. Dialta and her fellow plaintiffs moved to have the court declare that
Beacci was indeed Arthur Acton’s biological daughter. They therefore argued
that Beacci had the right to add the name Acton to her own, and to have the
sentenza registered.86 NYU raised a number of objections, which included a
request for a new CTU and the appointment of an expert in probability to high-
light and ascertain the exact genes attributed to Acton in the DNA test.87 Most
importantly, for the first time, NYU raised the issue of leggitmazione passiva, ar-
guing that according to Article 276 of the Civil Code, they were not the proper
defendants in the case.88
In 2007, in order to resolve the issue of the lack of a proper defendant, the
Tribunale of Florence, under the direction of Judge Zazzari, resolved, but did not
decide, to appoint a curatore speciale, or a special trustee, in order to overcome
the defendants’ objections that they were not the proper defendants in the case.89
The judge, according to court documents, arrived at this decision by using a
“constitutionally oriented interpretation” of Articles 276 and 274 of the Civil
Code.90
82 App., 27 febbraio 2013, n. 738 (Firenze), slip op. at 7.
83 Note that the 2009 case states one of the reasons the Beaccis re-proposed all the issues in front
of the court again was to overcome the objections raised by NYU regarding their lack of promptness
in continuing the case after Liana Beacci’s death. Trib., 27 agosto 2009, n. 2634, slip op. at 3.
84 A Consulente Tecnico is a clerk of the judge whose task is to brief the judge on techni-
cal clarifications requested by the judge after certain investigations by the court have been or-
dered. See Consulente Tecnico: Diritto processuale Civile [Technical Consultant: Civil Procedure
Law], Dizionario Treccani, http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/consulente-tecnico-
diritto-processuale-civile (last visited Mar. 14, 2015).
85 Eredità di sir Acton gli eredi: Beacci perdono la causa, La Repubblica.it, Sept. 2, 2009,
http://ricerca.repubblica.it/repubblica/archivio/repubblica/2009/09/02/eredita-
di-sir-acton-gli-eredi-beacci.html.
86 App., 13 maggio 2013, n. 738 (Firenze), slip op. at 8.
87 Id. at 3.
88 Id. at 9.
89 Trib., 27 agosto 2009, n. 2634, slip op. at 3.
90 App., 13 maggio 2013, n. 738 (Firenze), slip op. at 3. Article 247 of the Codice di procedura
civile, or Civil Code of Procedure, allows for an appointment of a curatore speciale in the case of the
death of a father, mother or child (and the death of their ascendents, descendants, or the son’s wife,
who are all given the right to bring the claim in case of the death of one of the three original holders
of the right) who would have been the defendant in an action of disconoscimento, or disownment.
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C Round 3: The Curatore Speciale and the Constitutional Questions:
Primo Grado, Secondo Grado, Corte di Cassazione: 2007–2014
NewYork University immediately objected to the appointment of a curatore spe-
ciale. However, the court of appeals in Florence dismissed its appeal since Judge
Zazzari had only resolved to appoint a curatore speciale, and had not taken spe-
cific legal action to do so. The appeals court noted that NYU did not have the
decision itself from the Tribunale judge. Furthermore, since the objection to a
curatore speciale was part of an incidental appeal, that is, a contestation of the
same original sentenza (in regards to the CTU and DNA evidence) to which the
Beaccis had also raised their own contestations, NYU’s objections needed to be
filed according to Article 343 of the Civil Code of Procedure, that is in a response
brief, and not directly in front of the court of appeals.91
It is at this stage that the case was given a new judge. Under Italian law,
judges must leave cases every ten years in order to maintain an air of impartial-
ity.92 The new President of the Tribunale, Judge Miranda, on June 21, 2007,
rejected the Beaccis’ request to execute the Tribunale’s resolution of January 15,
2007 to appoint a curatore speciale, reasoning that a special trustee was only
to be appointed, according to Article 78 of the Italian Civil Procedure Code, in
three specific instances, which did not include the lack of a proper defendant.93
The Beaccis appealed, asking the court of appeals in Florence to remand the case
to the Tribunale with an injunction that the Tribunale finally appoint the cura-
tore speciale. The court of appeals held that Judge Miranda was not bound to
apply the interpretation of Judge Zazzari, and that without an explicit sentenza
additiva of the Constitutional Court, according to a 2005 Cassazione precedent,
a special trustee could not be appointed in the face of the lack of a defendant,
agreeing with the narrow interpretation of the text.94 When the Corte di Cas-
sazione heard the appeal in 2010, the court held that the issues on appeal argued
by the Beaccis were essentially complaints that a curatore speciale had not been
nominated: a tortious claim, which the Corte di Cassazione was not allowed to
even address on appeal, sinceCassazione appeals may only be heard on procedu-
Judge Zazzari’s interpretation read article 247 alongside article 276, seeing them as mirror images
of each other, and reasoned that in reference to the following articles of the Constitution: Article
2 (recognizing the inviolable rights of a person); 3 (equality before the law); 24 (anyone may bring
cases before a court of law); and 30 (the law ensures such legal measures . . . as are compatible with
the rights of the members of the legitimate family to any children born out of wedlock); the same
opportunity to appoint a defendant needed to be available in each article.
91 See Codice di procedura civile [C.p.c.] art. 343; Trib., 27 agosto 2009, n. 2634, slip op.
at 10.
92 Interview with Avv. Andrea Cecchetti, Of Counsel, Chiomenti Studio Legale in Rome, Italy
(Feb. 24, 2014) (on file with author).
93 These three specific instances include an “incapable, [a] legal entity or [a] non-registered com-
pany where that party’s representative or assistance is missing.” Grossi & Pagni, supra note 18,
at 136; see also Cass., sez. I, 28 maggio 2010, n. 13099.
94 Cass., sez. I, 28 maggio 2010, n. 13099. Sentenze additive are opinions by the Italian Consti-
tutional Court in which it declares the unconstitutionality of a statute and adds to the statute, where
the statute “does not cover something for which it should provide.” Vittoria Barsotti et al., The
Constitutional Court: Rules and Models, in Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context
(forthcoming 2015).
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ral grounds.95 Therefore, theCorte di Cassazione only addressed whether, under
Article 80 of the Civil Code of Procedure, which affords discretion to the judge
to appoint a curatore speciale, the Tribunale judge acted properly. Observing
that the Tribunale judge did act properly because the decision to not appoint a
special trustee is not exempt from the judge’s general power to modify or revoke
decrees, the Corte di Cassazione held the issue inadmissible to the court.96
In the meantime, the Tribunale of Florence, still in the process of deciding
the principal case after some delays resulting from the curatore speciale appeals,
rendered its own decision on the merits of the case in 2009. Noting that contrary
to NYU’s objections, the case had properly survived the procedural requirements
of continuance of the action after Beacci’s death, and that the previous resolution
to appoint a curatore speciale was not a sentenza, and therefore had no decisive
legal effect on the case, the Tribunale held that, despite the legal action’s admis-
sibility, NYU was not the proper defendant. The Tribunale relied on the Corte
di Cassazione’s reasoning in a 2005 case precedent, which held that in an action
for judicial declaration of paternity the necessary defendants are, in the case of
the death of the presumed parent, exclusively his heirs, and not the heirs of his
heirs or other subjects, even if they have an interest in challenging the legal issue.
To these heirs of the heirs is instead recognized the right to solely intervene in
the case to protect their own interests.97
The Tribunale’s reasoning rested in a textual analysis of Article 276, which
at the time provided that a biological child may only sue her presumed parent or
her presumed parent’s heirs, and not the heirs of her presumed parent’s heirs, for
a declaration of paternity. The Tribunale also recognized that only the legislature
or the Constitutional Court could decide that Article 276 should be interpreted
analogously to Article 247, and not the ordinary courts themselves. The court
also recognized that the Constitutional Court had previously held that the deci-
sion to not appoint a curatore speciale in the face of a lack of the presumed father
and his heirs and to not allow the heirs of the heirs to be sued for a declaration
of paternity properly fell within the discretion of the legislature.98 The Tribunale
also noted that it made practical sense to only allow as defendants those who
have direct knowledge of the situations relevant to a declaration of paternity
and not the heirs of the heirs who know less or nothing. Likewise the Tribunale
also justified the lack of nomination of a curatore speciale by citing to the Ital-
ian Constitution’s decision to balance the rights of the biological child with the
95 Cass., sez. I, 28 maggio 2010, n. 13099, slip op. at 3.
96 Id.
97 Cass., sez. un., 3 novembre 2005, n. 21287, Foro. it. 2006, I, 740. The Beacci party contests
that this is the true holding of the case, arguing that the Constitutional Court did not in fact hold
this, but rather noted that it was in the discretion of the legislature to accomplish either option: to
allow the declaration to be brought before a special trustee or allow the heirs of the heirs to be defen-
dants. Therefore, the Constitutional Court may not render judgment on the question because such
a hypothetical produces a duplicate and alternative reason to find Article 276 unconstitutional, and
therefore the question may not be decided upon by the Court. See alsoMemorandum by Avv. Andrea
Cecchetti 5 (Oct. 2010) (citing Cass., sez. un., 3 novembre 2005, n. 21287) (on file with author).
98 The reasoning being that in Article 30, the legislature is empowered by the Constitution to
establish “rules and constraints for the determination of paternity.” Art. 30 Costituzione [Cost.].
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rights of the legitimate family, or the family based on marriage, in Article 30.
The Beaccis appealed this Tribunale decision, which effectively left themwith
no person to sue in order to secure their right to a declaration of paternity as the
heirs of Liana Beacci. The appeals court relied onmuch the same reasoning as the
Tribunale, justifying the inclusion of NYU as defendants in the case by declaring
that the admissibility proceedings had no bearing on a judgment on the merits
of the paternity case and that NYU had acted as a third party in the case.99
Again quoting from the 2005 Corte di Cassazione decision, the appeals court
relied on statutory interpretation—namely the clarity of the term “his heirs” in
Article 276; the lack of the phrase “those having cause” in the Article, which
is usually included by the legislature to indicate an extension of the right to
different persons; and that the clause that interested third parties may intervene
in the case—as sufficient indications that the legislature did not intend to include
the appointment of a curatore speciale.100
At the time of the appeals case, the 2012 filiazione reform had entered into
effect, modifying Article 276 to include the appointment of a curatore speciale.
The appeals court held the law could not be applied to the Beacci case because
a norm’s conditions need to be respected from the beginning of the lawsuit, the
curatore speciale needs to be appointed before even bringing the case to court,
and that the very same, as an alternate defendant, cannot simply “jump out at
the moment of the final Appeals discussion.”101 In a judgment deposited with the
court in September 2014, the Corte di Cassazione held that Article 276 of the
current Civil Code, with the incorporated norms of the 2012 filiazione reform,
was to be applied to the Beacci case, ruling that the Beaccis must be allowed
to sue a court appointed curatore speciale for a declaration of paternity.102 The
Cassazione reasoned that the curatore speciale was a necessary part of the liti-
gation, whether or not the court deemed the judgment in the case “almost con-
cluded.” The court emphasized that the Beaccis had moved for the appointment
of a curatore speciale at the trial level, that the appointment of a curatore spe-
ciale was a part of this ongoing case, and therefore fell under the application
of the current Civil Code, with its reforms.103 The court deliberately character-
ized the procedural posture of the case as ongoing, and not almost concluded,
thereby allowing the application of the new filiazione reform.Moreover, theCas-
sazione placed great emphasis on the legislative intent embodied in the filiazione
reform.104 The court noted that in radically modifying the legal parent-child re-
lationship, by making the status of the child to be one and only one, and in
providing that rights of succession that derive from the child’s new legal status
99 App., 27 febbraio 2013, n. 738 (Firenze), slip op. at 25–26.
100 Id. at 30.
101 Id. at 35. The court specifically noted that if appointed at this time, “the trustee would not
only find himself to respond to a judgment that developed practically entirely without him, but he
would also have to share the role of defendant with other heirs of the heir against whom the case
was initially brought, and who cannot, as if under a spell, disappear from the procedural scene only
because they are no longer necessary.” Id.
102 Cass., sez. I, 9 settembre 2014, n. 19790.
103 Id. at 11, 17.
104 Id. at 19–20.
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be immediately operative, the legislature wanted to favor to the greatest extent
possible the equality of children. Therefore, the scope of the application of the
revised Article 276 needed to be understood as broadly as possible.105 From the
point of view of this legislative intent, the court interpreted Article 104 of decree
law No. 154 of 2013, which provided for the application of the 2012 filiazione
reform to children born before its entrance into force, so long as no final judg-
ment had already been entered as to their status, to apply to the Beacci case.106
Recognizing the fundamental importance of the right to know one’s lineage, the
Cassazione has allowed the Beaccis the right to have Liana Beacci declared the
daughter of Arthur Acton.
IV Disposition of the Law
In Italy, cases involving foreign citizens, which might involve conflicts of law is-
sues, are first governed by the norms of Diritto Internazionale Privato.107 These
norms are contained in Law No. 218 of May 31, 1995 (Law No. 218).108 Arti-
cle 3 generally applies Italian jurisdiction when the defendant has his domicile or
residence (defined in Article 43 as “the place where he has established the princi-
pal center of his business and interests” and “the place where the person has his
habitual abode,” respectively) in Italy.109 Article 35 states that in legal actions
for recognition of biological children, the law of the state of which the child is
a citizen at the time of his birth applies.110 If the laws of the State of which the
recognizing parent is a citizen are more favorable, then those are applied. As
part of the 2012 filiazione reform, the Italian legislature added to Article 35 a
last clause: If the laws of the State of which the recognizing parent is a citizen
105 Id. at 21.
106 Id. at 22–24. The court expressly noted that this application avoids the injustice that would
result if only some groups of children, based only on the time they filed their action, were allowed to
take advantage of the new law. Moreover, the court denied that this provided too much protection
for children, noting that the statutes of limitations regarding when children or other descendants
may step into the shoes of the child petitioning for a declaration of paternity upon that child’s death,
still applied. In other words, had the Beaccis replaced Liana Beacci as the party to the lawsuit in an
untimely fashion, they would not have been able to take advantage of the application of the revised
Article 276. In this way, repose for defendants is still protected by the law. Id.
107 Italy uses a civil law system, and provides that its sources of law are laws, regulations, corporate
rules, and usages, in that order. Regio Derecto 16 marzo 1942, n. 262, art. 1, G.U. Apr. 4, 1942,
n. 79; see also John Henry Merryman, The Italian Style (pt. 1), 18 Stan. L. Rev. 396, 398–99
(1966). The Italian Constitution is also considered a primary source of law. Unlike in common law
systems, where case law may generate binding precedent, the Italian legal system only looks to cases
as non-binding secondary sources which may help to interpret a rule promulgated by the legislature.
Doctrine is regarded as more pervasive and important than case law. See John Henry Merryman,
The Italian Style (pt. 1), 18 Stan. L. Rev. 39, 42 (1965) (“The towering importance of the doctrine
makes it the logical initial focus of an investigation of the Italian style.”). As a result of the emphasis
placed on doctrine, I have heavily leaned on academic sources for this Note more than cases.
108 Legge 31 maggio 1995, n. 218, G.U. June 3, 1995, n. 128.
109 Id., art. 3, translated in Susana Beltramo, The Italian Civil Code and Complimentary
Legislation, app. f, at 855 (Mario Beltramo et al. eds. & trans., 2012).
110 L. n. 218/1995, art. 35.
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do not allow for recognition of a child, then Italian law applies.111
When Beacci filed her claim in 1995, the Tribunale applied Italian law, be-
cause at her birth, she was a citizen of Italy.112 Moreover, although Beacci was
born in 1917 and had not brought her claim until 1995, the court applied the
rules of the 1942 Civil Code as they were at the time of the lawsuit’s filing (af-
ter the 1975 Family Law reform) and not as they were at the time of her birth.
According to Article 232 of the 1975 Family Law reform, the law is retroactive;
that is, it applies to legal actions for declaration of paternity even when the child
is born or conceived prior to the entry into force of the Reform.113 Normally in
the Italian legal system, laws are not retroactive.114 However, in matters of civil
law, Italian legislatures are allowed to deviate from this norm, if they specifi-
cally provide for the law’s retroactivity within the law itself.115 Declarations of
paternity are retroactive, that is, once pronounced, they apply to the child from
the time of birth.116
In contrast to actions involving declarations of paternity, Article 46 of Law
No. 218, which governs succession upon death, applies the law of the State of
which the de cuius, the deceased, whose inheritance is the subject of the suc-
cession, was a citizen.117 In the Beacci case, this meant that English law would
111 In Italian, the 2012 Act of Parliament, Legge 10 dicembre 2012, n. 219, G.U. Dec. 17, 2012,
n. 293, called the Riforma Filiazione, struck any difference between children, who had previously
been classified as legitimate or biological (naturale), from the Code and modified other aspects of
the relationships between children and their parents. See L. n. 218/1995, art. 35. With this same
reform, the legislature struck Article 34 from the 1995 law, which had provided for the applicable
law in cases of legitimization. The 2012 reform struck the words legitimate or legitimization, and
any cause of action for legitimization from the Civil Code, instead relying on the act of recognition
to affirm a child’s status. L. n. 219/2012.
112 Interview with Avv. Andrea Cecchetti, supra note 92.
113 Legge 19 maggio 1975, n. 151, art. 232, G.U. May 23, 1975, n. 135; Maria Dossetti,
Dichiarazione giudiziale di paternità naturale successiva alla riforma del diritto di famiglia e diritti
del figlio sulla successione del proprio genitore apertasi prima della riforma, 2010 Famiglia, per-
sone e successioni 667, 667–69, is extremely illuminative on this point.
114 This principle is rooted in Article 25 of the Italian Constitution, which provides “No pun-
ishment may be inflicted except by virtue of a law in force at the time the offence was com-
mitted.” Art. 25 Costituzione [Cost.], translated in Senato della Repubblica, Constitu-
tion of the Italian Republic, http://www.senato.it/documenti/repository/istituzione/
costituzione_inglese.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2015). The principle is codified in Regio Derecto
16 marzo 1942, n. 262, art. 11, G.U. Apr. 4, 1942, n. 79 (“The law does not decide but for what is
to come: it does not have a retroactive effect.”).
115 Corte Cost., 14 gennaio 1994, n. 6, http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/1994/02/
02/094C0064/s1 (“In decrees it is recognized that the Constitution does not establish a prohibition
on retroactive laws (excepting criminal laws), but it is emphasized that these need to correspond to
the general criteria of reasonableness and cannot violate other Constitutional principles.”).
116 See Cass., sez. I, 22 novembre 2000, n. 15063 (“nel nostro ordinamento il riconoscimento del
figlio naturale comporta, a norma dell’art. 261 c.c., tutti i doveri propri della procreazione legittima,
compreso quello dell’assunzione dello status genitoriale, e, quindi, dell’obbligo di mantenimento, a
partire, ovviamente, dalla nascita del figlio.”). In this case, a father’s duty to pay back child support
for his daughter was affirmed to arise from the time he had recognized her, whether or not he had
approved of her schooling. See also Vincenzo Barba, La successione mortis causa dei figlii naturali
dal 1942 al disegno di legge recante “Disposizioni in materia di riconoscimento dei figli naturali,”
2012 Famiglia, persone e successioni 645 (discussing the evolution of succession law as applied
to natural children born before the 1975 reform).
117 Italian law uses many terms from Roman law. De cuius refers to the one who has died. This
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be applied. Indeed, when Beacci first filed suit in 1995, NYU argued that En-
glish inheritance law at the time of Liana’s birth, which “at the time ruled out
illegitimate relatives for inheritance,” should apply.118 Under English conflict of
law rules, however, “[s]uccession to movable property is governed by the law
of the last domicile of the deceased” while “[s]uccession to immovable property
is governed by the lex situs.”119 Acton’s death occurred in Florence, where he
was domiciled, and Villa La Pietra is located in Florence, Italy. Therefore, if the
Beacci succession claim is eventually tried in Italian court, Italian law will most
likely apply.
It is important to note that NYU could still argue that English law, and not
Italian law, should apply under international conflicts of law rules. There are
many “modern international codifications of international private law [which]
do not favor renvoi.”120 Renvoi, in which two forums ping-pong back and forth
by referring to each other’s rules of conflict of law rules and substantive law
to decide what law applies to the issue, can theoretically lead to impossible sit-
uations. As scholars have noted, many countries apply a foreign court theory
in order to avoid this perpetual renvoi.121 Italy is such a country. Article 13
of Italy’s Law No. 218 states renvoi will apply when the foreign law accepts it
Note translates de cuius as “deceased.” Please note that Italian law uses the word successione to
refer to the act of inheriting one’s patrimony. In this Note, it is translated as “succession.” Eredità is
used in Italian law to refer to inheritance—both the goods a person gives upon his death and goods
another person receives. In this Note, eredità is translated as “inheritance.” Italian law also uses
the word patrimonio, which is translated as “heritage,” and means that which a family or spouses
accumulate together. Patrimonio is often used in Italian law in articles of the Civil Code, which
regulate one spouse’s use and management of family goods.
118 Sophie Arie, Art Connoisseur’s Body may be Exhumed in Italy to Settle Row over £300m
Estate, Guardian (Apr. 25, 2003, 6:05 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/apr/
25/arts.highereducation. This argument was part of preliminary discussion of the case by the
parties as noted above. The inheritance claim, although filed, has not yet been legally tried in court.
119 J.G. Collier, Conflict of Laws 11 (3d ed. 2001).
120 Renvoi is understood as the legal phenomenon in which one State, A, looks not only to the
substantive law of State B, but also to State B’s choice of law rules—their “whole law.” In this way,
StateB could point back to StateA, which effectivelymeans that while theoretically applying StateB’s
laws, State A in practice simply applies their own law. This is what Italy would do when it applied
its own law by referring to England’s conflict of law rules. See also Michael Bogdan, Private Interna-
tional Law as Component of the Law of the Forum, 348 Recueil des Cours [Collected Courses
Hague Acad. Int’l L.] 9, 210 (2011). The Author notes that these include the EC Regulation
No. 593/2008 and also the Rome I Regulation. Specifically in matters of succession, over time, some
international documents have simply stated which law should apply to the estates and succession of
foreign nationals, instead of providing explicitly for no renvoi, although themajority of these conven-
tions have not been ratified. See, e.g., Convention on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates
of Deceased Persons, art. 4, Aug. 1, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 146, 150, cited in Alberto Malatesta, Rinvio,
in Diritto internazionale privato [Private International Law] 422, 430 (Roberto Baratta
ed., 2010) (relative to Italian law); Convention on Conflicts between the Law of Nationality and
the Law of Domicile, June 15, 1955, http://www.hcch.net/upload/conventions/txt06en.pdf,
mentioned in Collier, supra note 119, at 393 (noting the United Kingdom was advised not to ratify
this treaty). Most recently, the EU has passed Brussels IV, which applies to estates of the deceased
post 2015, and which provides that where national law of the deceased has been chosen to apply
by the State, no other or later renvoi will apply. Commission Regulation 650/12, 2012 O.J. (L 201)
107.
121 Bogdan, supra note 120, at 208–09.
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and when that renvoi points to Italian law.122 NYU could argue that the foreign
court theory application would lead to a constant loop, or an “international
game of tennis,” in which neither Italian law nor English law would deem itself
competent to judge the succession.123 Therefore, the Italian court should only
apply the English law in terms of its substance. As a result, there is an argument
that the Beaccis could possibly be ruled out as legitimate relatives for inheritance
purposes.
The retroactivity of the 1975 Family Reform Law allows the application of
today’s Italian legislation to the Beacci declaration of paternity suit but does not,
however, apply to the laws of succession and to the Beacci inheritance claim to
Villa La Pietra.124 Italy’s Corte di Cassazione has held that according to the tem-
pus regit actum principle, a biological child who is recognized after the succes-
sion is openedwill be in line for the succession according to the law in place at the
time the succession was opened.125 Legal doctrine also supports this principle.126
It is for this reason that contextualizing the Italian laws of succession within the
history of Italian family law and its evolving treatment of legitimate and illegit-
imate children, the rights of women, and property rights between spouses is so
important. If the Beacci inheritance claim is tried in Italian court, that very same
Italian court will apply the law in effect at the time of Acton’s death in 1953—
the 1942 Civil Code prior to the 1975 reform. The Constitutional Court has
justified such an application, grounding the application of old norms to current
rights of succession in Article 30 of the Constitution, noting that by protecting
legitimate children, the Constitution neither requires that legitimate children re-
ceive less to be equal to natural children, nor the opposite, that natural children
receive more.127 However, with the advent of the 2012 filiazione reform, some
scholars have noted that there are “explosive consequences” that affect rights of
122 Legge 31 maggio 1995, n. 218, art. 13, G.U. June 3, 1995, n. 128. For a discussion of the
foreign court theory, see Bogdan, supra note 120, at 208. But see Malatesta, supra note 120, at 422–
23. Italian law defines rinvio indietro as a renvoi by the applicable foreign law back to the laws of
the state that chose the foreign law in the first place. Id. at 422. For a concise definition of renvoi
from a common law perspective, see Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 8 (Am. Law
Inst. 1971). Malatesta describes the foreign court theory, in which an English court, for example,
would decide the case of a Belgian national by acting as if they were “sitting in Belgium under the
particular circumstances of the case.” Malatesta, supra note 120, at 423.
123 Bogdan, supra note 120, at 208.
124 Dossetti, supra note 113, § 1.
125 Tempus regit actum stands for the principle that the law in place at the time the legal issue
arose is the law that the court will apply to resolve that issue. Id. § 3; see also Cass., sez. I, 26 giugno
1984, n. 3709, Foro it. 1984, I, 2160 (holding a child born in adultery once recognized by a judicial
declaration of paternity after the 1975 Family Law reform had entered into force had the right to
participate in the succession to his natural father, when that succession had been opened prior to
that date).
126 See generally 2 Commentario del Codice Civile: Delle Successioni [Commentary on
the Civil Code: On Succession] (Vincenzo Cuffaro & Francesco Delfini eds., 2009). Especially,
see Maria Dossetti, Art 573—Successione dei figli naturali [Art. 573: Succession of Biological Chil-
dren, in 2 Commentario del Codice Civile: Delle Successioni, supra, at 54–55.
127 For an enlightening description of the case, see Barba, supra note 116, at 658; see also Corte
Cost., 8 giugno 1984 n. 168.
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succession.128 Namely, abrogating any differences between children and deem-
ing them to have equal status affects their rights not only as to their parents
but also to each other. In this sense, the application of old norms to current
succession rights may be circumvented—if a sibling passes away, a child might
now claim considerably more generous rights of succession under the revised
and current Italian Civil Code.129 Moreover, some Italian scholars have noted
that the very fact that decree Law No. 154 of 2013, which gives legal effect to
the 2012 filiazione reform, gives children who were previously unrecognizable a
claim of right to succession at all goes against the principle of non-retroactivity
of the law.130
If NYU wants to successfully claim that Hortense owned the Villa in order
to exclude a colorable claim by Beacci, it will have to apply the property regime
in effect between spouses in 1953: separazione dei beni.131 Likewise, it will have
to lay the foundations for any feasible claim that Hortense alone owned Villa La
Pietra by presenting that Hortense could in fact own property under the 1865
Civil Code, which was in effect in 1907 when Villa La Pietra was purchased,
and therefore that it is possible that Hortense owned the Villa herself under the
separazione dei beni regime.132
A Summary of Twentieth Century Italian Legal History:
Napoleon—Fascism and the 1942 Civil Code—The Italian
Constitution of 1948—The 1975 Family Law Reform
The first Italian Civil Code was adopted in 1865 and was very similar to the
French Napoleonic Code.133 Rules governing the family in the 1865 Code were
based on the model of Italy’s agricultural economy; the conservative cultural
framework of the Code was seen as “instrumental to the unitary concept of
the family enterprise and the maintenance of concentrated ownership of land to
allow for economies of scale.”134 Absolute authority of the family patriarch was
perceived as vital to the continuing success of this family enterprise. Illegitimate
128 See generally Maria Dossetti, I nuovi successibili e il diritto intertemporale nella riforma di
filiazione, Fondazione Italiana del Notariato (Mar. 21, 2014) http://eventi.nservizi.it/
upload/72/altro/dossetti_relazione.pdf.
129 For a discussion of this and Article 104 of the 2013 decree-law, which address the retroac-
tivity and applicability of the current legal regime to children born before the passing of the 2012
reform into law, see Michele Sesta, Stato Unico di Filiazione e Successioni, Corte Suprema di Cas-
sazione: La filiazione dopo la riforma (Nov. 14, 2013), http://www.cortedicassazione.
it/cassazione-resources/resources/cms/documents/20131114_RelazioneSesta.pdf.
130 Id. at 19.
131 Note that at the time of the opening of Arthur Acton’s succession in 1953, the old Conflicts
of Rules in Italy, attached to the 1942 Civil Code, provided that “Personal relationships between
spouses of different citizenship are regulated by the last law of the State which was common to them
during their marriage.” Corte Cost., 26 febbraio 1987, n. 71, http://www.gazzettaufficiale.
it/eli/id/1987/03/11/087C0154/s1.
132 Legge 31 maggio 1995, n. 218, art. 51, G.U. June 3, 1995, n. 128 confirms this, by stating
rights to immovable property are regulated by the law of the state in which the immovable property
is located.
133 Beltramo, supra note 109, at v.
134 Jeffery S. Lena & Ugo Mattei, Introduction to Italian Law 408 (2002).
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children were given no inheritance or legitimization rights unless recognized by
the father, presumably since they were viewed as a threat to this very same family
enterprise.135 In fact, according to Article 189 of the 1865 Code, investigations
into paternity were not allowed except in cases of abduction or violent rape,
when the timing of these events corresponded with the conception of a child.136
Notwithstanding this emphasis on patriarchy, however, the 1865 Code did
grant women the legal right to property, even upon marriage.137 While other
laws effectively assured the husband’s continued authority, a woman’s ability
to own property and her ability to dispose of it after death allowed a pocket
of Italian women to gain “economic citizenship,” a place in the public sphere
usually reserved to men.138
The 1942 Civil Code itself, created under the Fascist regime, retained the
same authoritative patriarchal model, although it did reflect changes in the law,
which accommodated Italy’s new and diverse economy.139 Changes specific to
family law from the 1865 Code include an expansion of the normative chapter
regulating illegitimate and legitimate filiazione. This chapter included extend-
ing instances in which paternity could be investigated and declared without a
spontaneous recognition by the parent, and the possibility of awarding the ille-
gitimate child support upon the declaration.140 Despite this, the 1942 Code still
heavily distinguished between legitimate and illegitimate children.
The earliest significant change to family law in Italy came with the adoption
of the Italian Constitution after World War II. Together, Articles 29, 30, and
31 of the Italian Constitution “introduced an equal-responsibility model of the
family . . . now seen as a social formation based on marriage.”141 Article 3 recog-
nized the equal dignity of all before the law.142 Article 29 in particular recognizes
the family itself as a natural association, a protected unit based on the moral and
legal equality of husband and wife.143 Scholars have noted that the Italian Con-
stitution’s recognition of the family itself as a protected unit indicated “a strong
emphasis on community, on social relations, and on civil society, and a compar-
atively lesser emphasis merely on the autonomous individual, relative to other
135 Roberto Senigaglia, Status filiationis e dimensione relazionale dei rapporti di
famiglia 5 (2013) (citing Michele Sesta, I disegni di legge in materia di filiazione: dalla dis-
eguaglianza all’unicità dello status, in Famiglia diritto 963 (2012)).
136 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 189 (1865).
137 Stefania Licini, Assessing Female Wealth in 19th Century Milan, Italy 5 (Mar. 2010) (unpub-
lished thesis, University of Bergamo), http://www.victoria.ac.nz/sacl/about/events/past-
events2/past-conferences/6ahic/publications/6AHIC-05_FINAL_paper.pdf.
138 Examples of other laws, which effectively assured the husband’s continued authority, include:
marital authorization, the property regime in effect between spouses separazione dei beni, and arti-
cles regulating dowry. Marital Authorization, in effect until 1919, required a wife to receive permis-
sion from her husband to manage her own property. Id. at 18. For more on separazione dei beni,
see infra Part V; see also Licini, supra note 137, at 18–19.
139 Lena &Mattei, supra note 134; see alsoGuidao Alpa & Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, Ital-
ian Private Law 2 (2007).
140 Codice civile [C.c.] arts. 269, 277 (1942).
141 Lena & Mattei, supra note 134, at 409.
142 Art. 3 Costituzione [Cost.].
143 Id. art. 29.
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constitutional bills of rights or to international human rights instruments.”144
Notwithstanding these strong ideals, the Constitution nevertheless set up
some dichotomies between groups. At the same time as Article 30 proclaimed,
“It is the duty and right of parents to support, raise and educate their children,
even if born out of wedlock,” in the next breath, it announced conditions: “the
law ensures such legal and social protection measures as are compatible with
the rights of the members of the legitimate family to any children born out of
wedlock,” and “the law shall establish rules and constraints for the determi-
nation of paternity.”145 These dichotomies did and still produce tensions in the
legal application of the 1942 Civil Code, and in the application of constitutional
principles.146
With the advent of the Italian Constitution came the Constitutional Court,
which began to refine and more precisely define the limits and interpretations
of these constitutional principles regarding the family.147 One result of these in-
teractions was Law No. 151 of May 19, 1975. An overhaul of the 1942 Family
Law regime in many ways, one of its main innovations was to introduce the
community property regime in order to give effect to Article 29 of the Constitu-
tion.148
B Declarations of Paternity: The Legal Framework
Traditionally in Italian law, illegitimate and biological children had no rights
unless recognized by their parents.149 This difference between illegitimate (but
144 Key Rights and Freedoms, in Italian Constitutional Justice in Global Context, supra
note 94 (manuscript at 68).
145 Art. 30 Costituzione [Cost.].
146 Notwithstanding this dichotomy and tension, some Italian legal scholars have noted that the
specific wording of Article 30, with the use of the phrase “as are compatible,” does not in and of itself
absolutely preclude (and therefore may make constitutional) a difference in the legal frameworks for
natural and legitimate children. Andrea Torrente & Piero Schlessinger, Manuale di diritto
privato § 604, at 1204 (Franco Anelli & Carlo Granelli eds., 21st ed. 2013).
147 Examples of Constitutional Court opinions include: Corte Cost., 14 aprile 1969, n. 79, Foro it.
1969, I, 1033; Corte Cost., 30 aprile 1973, n. 50, Foro it. 1973, I, 1684; Corte Cost., 27 marzo 1974,
n. 82, Foro it. 1974, I, 1293 (narrowly defining the nuclear legitimate family to consist of a marriage
between the natural father and his spouse and their legitimate children only); Corte Cost., 11 marzo
1968, n. 9, http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/1968/03/30/068C0009/s1 (abolished
adultery as a crime, only women having been punished for it); Corte Cost., 12 luglio 1965, n. 70,
Foro it. 1965, I, 1369 (extending the instances in which paternity can be investigated, since this
investigation is a fundamental tool to effectuate judicial and social protection for children born
out of wedlock); Corte Cost., 16 febbraio 1963, n. 7, Foro it. 1963, I, 471 (declaring a 1942 law
which precluded children born before the new 1942 Civil Code from ascertaining their status to be
unconstitutional); see also Dossetti, supra note 113, n.11.
148 Alpa & Zeno-Zencovich, supra note 139, at 47–54.
149 Italian dictionaries distinguish a nautrale (biological) child as a child born of parents not united
in marriage, and an illegitimate child as a classification of a biological child before the 1975 Reform.
See, e.g., Dizionario Devoto Oli 1095, 1318 (Luca Serragni & Maurizio Mollie eds., 2014).
Under the 1942Civil Code, legitimate childrenwere only natural childrenwhose parents hadmarried
after their birth, and natural children declared legitimate by royal decree. Codice civile [C.c.]
art. 280 (1942). A natural child who was judicially declared to be their parent’s child was recognized,
but not legitimate. Codice civile [C.c.] art. 277 (1942).
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biological) children and legitimate ones was present in the 1865 Code and con-
tinued in the 1942 Code. Not existing in a vacuum, these differences between
children affected other areas of law and the family, including their succession
rights. One of the results of this differentiation was the facolta di commutazione:
a legitimate child’s ability to buy a natural sibling out of an inheritance.150
The 1975 Reform expanded recourse to judicial declarations of paternity
introduced in the 1942 Civil Code. Changes included:
1. While previous to the 1975 Reform, a judicial declaration of paternity was
only possible in four cases—notorious co-habitation between the mother
and the presumed father, an indirect statement or other non-equivocal
written indication by the presumed father, rape or other sexual assault,
and the possession of the status of a natural child151—the 1975 Reform
provided that if a child was legally allowed to be recognized, the child
could pursue a judicial declaration of paternity.
2. Before the 1975 Reform, certain classes of children, including those con-
ceived in adultery, could not be recognized: The 1975 Reform abolished
this, effectively allowing children born as products of adulterous relation-
ships to sue for a judicial declaration of paternity.152
3. The 1975 Reform expanded the means of proof of paternity in the action,
allowing every means of proof to be used.153
Judicial opinions have still continued to change elements of declaration of
paternity suits. Most recently, in 2006, the Constitutional Court declared Ar-
ticle 274, which required the court to conduct a preliminary judicial review to
ascertain the declaration of paternity action, unconstitutional.154 The most re-
cent 2012 filiazione reform struck any semantic differences from the Code, using
only the term figlio, and not legittimo or naturale. It has also revised Article 276,
which governs who may be the leggitimato passivo, or defendant, in a declara-
tion of paternity suit.
150 See Codice civile [C.c.] art. 541 (1942); see also Giovanni Bonilini, Manuale di diritto
ereditario e delle donazioni 133–35 (4th ed. 2006).
151 Anna Lisa Buonadonna et al., Dichiarazione giudiziale di paternità e maternità, in Le con-
troversie in materia di filiazione 157, 158 (2010). Historically, such limits on ascertainment
of paternity were justified by a desire to preserve the good name of men and to avoid scandal.
152 Riconoscimento del figlio naturale e giudizio conseguente all’opposizione, in Le controversie
in materia di filiazione, supra note 151, at 117, 118. Note that under the 2012 Reform there
are still some classes of children who cannot be recognized, namely children who have already been
recognized as the child of another. See generally Torrente & Schlissinger, supra note 146, app.
153 See Le controversie in materia di filiazione, supra note 151, at x.
154 Dichiarazione giudiziale di paternità e maternità, supra note 151, at 159; Corte Cost., 10 feb-
braio 2006, n. 50, Foro it. 2006, I, 966. It is important to note that, since Liana Beacci’s request for
declaration of paternity was filed in 1997, her claim was indeed evaluated for its admissibility, and
this part of the case, in fact, was appealed all the way to the Corte di Cassazione.
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Currently, there is no prescription on, or statute of limitations on, declaration
of paternity cases in Italy.155 A child may bring the action at any time, provided
he is in a class of children that is able to be recognized.156 Every means may be
given to ascertain proof of paternity, except for a mother’s sole declaration that
she had relations with the father at the time of conception.157 If the child dies
after having brought the action but while the action is still in progress, his descen-
dants of right may continue the action.158 Prior to being held unconstitutional,
Article 274 only allowed a declaration of paternity action to be admissible when
there are specific circumstances sufficient to make it seem justified.159 The inves-
tigation into the facts by the court is kept secret and must not be publicized.160
C Succession Laws: The Legal Framework under the 1942 Civil Code
at the Time of Arthur Acton’s Death
In matters of succession, Italian civil law does not privilege a person’s testamen-
tary freedom above all else.161 Rather, Italian inheritance law protects a person’s
legal heirs in the face of a written testament or even without it. This rule has ex-
isted in Italian law throughout the twentieth century. Article 721 of the 1865
Code provided for successione legittima, or forced heirship when a person dies
intestate, which recognized women and men as equally capable to inherit.162
The heirs succeeded in the following order: the children and descendants, the
deceased’s brothers and sisters, and finally, other relatives.163 The 1865 Code
framed successione legittima as a way to own property.164
Under successione legittima, a deceased’s heirs are entitled to a portion of the
deceased’s goods when the deceased dies intestate.165 This guaranteed portion
is generally called a quota or a riserva. Notwithstanding this guaranteed quota,
the deceased is still legally allowed to will away a portion of his property if he
155 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 270.
156 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 269.
157 Id.
158 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 270.
159 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 274.
160 Id.
161 Antonio Annunziata et al., Successioni mortis causa nella famiglia legittima e nat-
urale, at vii–ix, 13–15 (2012).
162 It is important here not to confuse the term legittimo in the Declaration of Paternity legal
framework with the term legittimario in the Succession legal framework. A legittimo is a legitimate
child: a child born to two parents in wedlock. A legittimario is one who has a right under the law. A
child born out of wedlock, a biological child, becomes a legittimario, or one with the right to claim
his inheritance, when he is judicially declared to be the natural child of his parent. This declaration
does not make him, prior to the 2012 filiazione reform, however, a legitimate child, since legitimate
children were only those born to married parents. See Barba, supra note 116, at 646.
163 Id.; see also Codice civile [C.c.] art. 721 (1865).
164 Antonio Albanese, La successione legittima tra passato e futuro, 2012 Famiglia, persone e
successione 614.
165 Manuale di diritto ereditario e delle donazioni, supra note 150, at 187; Albanase,
supra note 164. Italian law also has a legal succession regime entitled successione necessaria. In
general, sucessione necessaria refers to the corrective rules of succession under Italian law, while
successione leggittima refers to the system of these corrective rules which supplement or stand in
for a last will and testament when all or part of the quota reserved for certain leggittimari, or rights
230 Notre Dame J. Int’l & Comp. L. [vol. 5:1
does leave a will; that will, however, cannot affect the quota reserved to his so
called “forced heirs”—in other words, they are guaranteed an inheritance. If
it does, the heirs may enforce their legally reserved quota against the last will
and testament, taking legal recourse to the rules of successione necessaria, upon
which the successione legittima regime also relies and which it incorporates.166
Scholars have argued that the 1942 Civil Code’s presentation of the successione
legittima legal regime imbues meaning to what was previously one way to inherit
property; they characterize this legal framework as a way to “perpetuate the
family group.”167
Under the 1942 Civil Code, that family group, informed by the laws regulat-
ing filiazione, was narrowly defined. In the 1942 Code, separate articles differen-
tiated between the vested inheritance rights under both the succesione legittima
and successione necessaria regimes for recognized biological children and legit-
imate children.168 Article 536 defines the leggitimari, or forced heirs, in the fol-
lowing order of importance: legitimate children, legitimate ascendants (mother,
father, etc.), the natural children, and the wife. Article 537 details specific per-
centages, which operate to divide the deceased goods to legitimate children: half
of the patrimony if the deceased leaves an only child, and two-thirds to the le-
gitimate children to be divided equally if they are more than one.169 In contrast,
Article 539 only assures a third of the patrimony to a biological child if they are
the only child, and half of the patrimony to be divided among them if they are
more than one.170 The 1942 Code only leaves surviving spouses the right to a
life estate in two-thirds of the deceased spouse’s property.171 In the case where
there are both biological and legitimate children, Article 541 provides that no
less than two-thirds of the patrimony be left to all the children collectively, and
then that each biological child retain half the portion that each legitimate child
holders, is either willed away or simply left after the deceased dies intestate. See Albanese, supra
note 164. In the United States, this legal regime is commonly referred to as “forced heirship.” For the
analogous relationship with forced heirship, see The Law of Succession: Testamentary Freedom
(Miriam Anderson & Esther Arroyo i Amayueles eds., 2011). In my analysis, I generally refer to the
quotas guaranteed by successione necessaria, which provide the floor for the quotas guaranteed to
legittimari, or rights holders, since Arthur Acton’s will has not been found. If by chance Arthur
Acton’s will does come to light in the future, the Beaccis will be able to resort to these “floors” to
claim their inheritance. If, however, a will was not written and Arthur Acton truly died intestate,
scholars have noted that the norms of successione legittima provide a potential ceiling—that is, the
Beaccis may claim up to half of Arthur Acton’s estate, since under Art. 574 of the 1942 Civil Code,
Liana Beacci could still have claimed only half the share that the legitimate child of Arthur Acton,
Harold Acton, could have claimed. Codice civile [C.c.] art. 574 (1942); see also Manuale di
diritto ereditario e delle donazioni, supra note 150, at 186.
166 Manuale di diritto ereditario e delle donazioni, supra note 150, at 186.
167 Albanese, supra note 164, at 614 n.1.
168 Codice civile [C.c.] arts. 537, 539, 541 (1942). To be clear, where 1942 Codice civile is
noted in this Note it refers to the 1942 Civil Code without the 1975 reform.
169 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 537 (1942).
170 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 539 (1942).
171 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 540 (1942). According to scholars, this treatment of the surviving
spouse was justified by the policy to keep property within the bloodline. See generallyAlbanese supra
note 164.
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retains, save for the fact that the actual portion which the legitimate children re-
tain cannot be less than a third.172 When there is a surviving spouse, a legitimate
child, and a biological child, Article 542 provides that two-thirds of the prop-
erty in its entirety is reserved for the forced heirs: one-fourth for the surviving
spouse in the form of a life estate to the property, with the remaining portion
(five-twelfths) being divided between the biological and legitimate children, ac-
cording to Article 541 stipulations.173
Under the 1942 Code, an heir may ask for his status as an heir to be recog-
nized by whomever possesses the goods of his inheritance. This act, petizione, is,
like the action for a declaration of paternity, without a statute of limitations.174
Usually, however, the heir would bring an action for riduzione, or reduction of
his quota from the patrimony the other heir had been given or held. In order
to bring an act for riduzione, the heir must have first accepted his inheritance,
and if he is a biological child, he must first have been recognized.175 The Civil
Code offers precise ways in which to calculate a riduzione of the patrimony al-
ready distributed, and yet, in regards to immovable property, it does provide
for certain circumstances—namely where there is not more than one fourth of
the value of an heir’s own portion in the immovable property.176 In this case,
there are two options: (1) leave the property intact to the beneficiary and give
the value of the forced heir’s portion to him as part of a riduzione; or (2) leave
the immovable property intact as part of the patrimony.177 The statute of limi-
tations for an action of riduzione is ten years, which begins to run from the time
172 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 541 (1942).
173 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 542 (1942).
174 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 533 (1942). The only possible bar to the action is usucapione, or
adverse possession. While NYU might possibly make such an argument, it is generally understood
that a party cannot claim adverse possession against a natural child before that child has been legally
recognized and therefore able to claim her inheritance. See Vincenzo Barba, Principi successori del
figlio nato fuori del matrimonioe problem di diritto transitorio, 5 Famiglia e Diritto 497, 513
n.56 (2014).
175 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 573 (1942) regulates recognition; Codice civile [C.c.] art. 564
regulates the need to accept. Bringing an action for riduzione also presupposes that the plaintiff
accepts his inheritance col beneficio d’inventario: a way of disclaiming any debts the estate may have
which might outweigh a forced heir’s portion and cause him to be liable to the estate’s expenses. See
Manuale di diritto ereditario e delle donazioni, supra note 150, at 155.
176 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 560 (1942).
177 Id. It is important to note that in order to claim a right on Harold Acton’s estate, and not
her father’s, Beacci must be judicially recognized. But may Beacci even make a claim directly on
Harold’s estate if she were to be recognized? According to Article 258, recognition had no effect
but towards the parent who effectuated the recognition. Some obligations have, however, been held
to exist between legitimate child and natural child, but not natural children of the same parent.
Codice civile [C.c.] art. 258 (1942). This has been explained under the theory of commutazione.
In contrast, the doctrine has held there is no such obligation between two natural siblings. See Barba,
supra note 116, at 651.What this couldmean for the viability of a claim by Liana Beacci and her heirs
to Harold’s estate is an interesting problem to pose, keeping in mind that since Harold Acton died in
1994, the laws of succession after the 1975 reform, which recognized the full relationship between
siblings and abolished commutazione, would be applied. There are also doctrinal arguments that
inheritance between a legitimate child and a natural one does not consist of a common inheritance
or patrimonio, as the family is defined under the 1942 statute. Id. at 651 n.30. But see the arguments
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the right is recognized as legally valid.178
V Applying the Law to the Acton Family, Liana Beacci, and Villa La
Pietra: The Four Scenarios
A NYU might have successfully claimed that NYU was not the
proper defendant in the case, thereby precluding Beacci’s heirs
from bringing their inheritance claim
Whereas, under Italian Law, the court of appeals reviews both the facts and the
law de novo, the Corte di Cassazione reviews only for errors of law, not for
fact.179 Parties must appeal to the Corte di Cassazione on the specific grounds
listed in Article 360 of the Civil Code of Procedure, which is considered an ex-
haustive list.180 While constitutional provisions are cited in Corte di Cassazione
cases, a judge sends questions on constitutional interpretations of the law di-
rectly to the Corte Costituzionale: the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional
Court then renders a decision on the constitutionality of the law in question and
how the judge should interpret it in the case.181
As a matter of law, Italian norms are not applied retroactively but for the
legislature’s express provision in the law itself that the law is retroactive.182 The
2012 filiazione reform did not expressly provide for the retroactive application
of the revised Article 276 of the Code in ongoing or pending suits for declarations
of paternity, even though it did expressly provide for the retroactive application
of other revised norms in the reform.183 NYU could first ground their argument
in such a procedural principle.
The Beacci party could counter that a strict interpretation that the revised
section of Article 276 of the Code is not to be applied retroactively renders
a procedural impossibility and contradiction under the current law. Namely,
declarations of paternity, which do not have a statute of limitations, are now
rendered subject to a “natural” statute of limitations—the death of an eventual
defendant for litigants who filed their suits prior to the entrance into force of
and hypotheses of Dossetti, supra note 128, and Sesta, supra note 129, that the intertemporal laws
of Derecto Legislativo 28 dicembre 2013, n. 154 art. 104, G.U. Jan. 8, 2014, n. 5 create a problem
of retroactivity of the laws of succession, effectively allowing children who had no claim of right of
succession at the time their parent died, to have a claim of right.
178 Corte Cost., 21 giugno 1983, n. 191, Foro it. 1983, I, 2074 (where a group of natural siblings
were contesting the statute of limitations after their inheritance claim was thrown out when ten years
had passed from the opening of the succession); see also Dossetti, supra note 113, at nn.15–16.
179 Grossi & Pagni, supra note 18, at 23.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 7–8. Unlike in the United States, parties may not directly petition the Constitutional
Court.
182 See supra notes 106–07.
183 Legge 10 dicembre 2012, n. 219, G.U. Dec. 17, 2012, n. 293. Article 4 of the law specifically
provides that the necessity of parents to continue to support children during divorce and separation
proceedings be retroactively applied to divorce and separation proceedings filed before the filiazione
reform. Id. art. 4.
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the 2012 filiazione reform.184 Moreover, such an application produces terrible
incentives for current defendants in declaration of paternity cases. An elderly
heir sued by a natural sibling, for example, might decide it is better to run the
“natural” statute of limitations clock, and delay the proceeding, effectively dying
before the sibling’s suit is able to be recognized. The Beaccis could argue that not
applying the revised Article 176 retroactively effectively creates a “black hole” in
the law, which is contrary to the very constitutional tenets and policy of Italian
family law today.185
NYU could counter this argument by highlighting the tension between the
protections enshrined in the Constitution. Yes, children born out of wedlock
have the same protections as those born within it, and yet the specific wording
of the constitutional article conditions this comparison of protection with the
word “compatible.”186 It could be considered “compatible” to effectively deny
natural children whose litigation began before the reform the right to sue for a
declaration. This might be considered “compatible” if one considers that legiti-
mate children are also barred from suing their parents for the same benefits that
would result from a declaration (support and education, for example) if their
parents and their parent’s heirs are dead.
The Beaccis could again counter this by saying that nevertheless, a legitimate
child could gain access to his reserved quota of inheritance, an act precluded to
the natural child by a non-retroactive application of Article 276. Furthermore,
the Beaccis could argue that it is a violation of equal protection under the law, as
enshrined in Article 3 of the Italian Constitution, to discriminate between one
class of natural children, those who have commenced litigation, and another,
those who have not commenced their cases for a declaration of paternity.187
This argument might necessitate a judgment by the Corte Costituzionale, which
has already struck down differentiations between classes of children on these
grounds.188
In fact, the Corte di Cassazione successfully accepted the Beaccis’ arguments
in 2014. The facts central to the court’s decision were that Article 104 of Law
No. 154 of 2013 allowed for the application of the revised Article 276 to pend-
ing suits for declaration of paternity, even if the child had been born prior to
the reform, and that it was the legislature’s intent to give effect to equality as
enshrined in the Italian Constitution.189
184 Memorandum by Avv. Andrea Cecchetti, supra note 97, at 3–4.
185 Id.
186 Art. 30 Costituzione [Cost.].
187 Art. 3 Costituzione [Cost.].
188 See Luigi Balestra, Note critiche sull’interpretazione dell’art. 276, comma primo c.c. ovvero
sulla vanificazione dell’interesse (a rilevanza costituzionale) del figlio naturale all’accertamento del
rapporto di filiazione, in Famiglia e successioni 61–70 (Elena Bellisario et al. eds., 2013). Balestra
cites Cass., sez. I, 24 agosto 1993, n. 8915 (noting that the ascertainment of paternity is to be
considered a form of legal protection) (citing Art. 30 Costituzione [Cost.]). Balestra also notes
that a preclusion to sue for paternity is contrary to the very tenants of the Italian Civil Code itself,
which allows the action to be imprescrittibile (with no statute of limitations).
189 Art. 3 Costituzione [Cost.].
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B NYU successfully claims Hortense was given Villa La Pietra by
her father, the millionaire Chicago banker William Mitchell,
thereby retaining sole title to the Villa as her personal property,
and therefore bequeathing clear title to her son Harold, and
then to NYU
The law at the time of the purchase of Villa La Pietra in 1907 governs who has
title to it.190 Upon the unification of Italy and the advent of the 1865 Code, all
women could own property.191 Women were also given equal inheritance rights
with men.192 Property that women received, whether by gift or through inheri-
tance, could still be willed away by them, whether they were single or married.193
Under the 1865 Code and up until the 1975 Family Law Reform, women and
men held property independently when married, in a property regime entitled
separazione dei beni.194 Nevertheless, the 1865 Code still presented obstacles to
women’s ownership of property.195 These obstacles included that property ac-
190 Regio Derecto 16 marzo 1942, n. 262, art. 11, G.U. Apr. 4, 1942, n. 79.
191 Licini, supra note 137, at 11. Prior to the 1865 Code, women could own property and inherit
in most regions in Italy. In the city of Milan, for example, “the legal right to property had been
granted to women since the Restoration era.” Id. at n.4. Discrepancies between different regional
legal systems produced great debate, especially from women activists.
192 See Codice civile [C.c.] art. 724 (1865). Women are not named among those who may not
succeed. Article 736 allows for legitimate children to succeed their parents, with no discrimination
as to sex. This was often undermined, however, by the social mores of Italian culture of the time,
in which parents tended to only give property to their sons, unless they only had daughters. Licini,
supra note 137, at 18–19.
193 Licini, supra note 137, at 5. In fact, it has been argued “inheritance was by far the main source
of wealth for women belonging to the upper class.” Id. at 14.
194 This property regime, in which each spouse retained independent ownership to their own prop-
erty, which they themselves acquired during marriage, was the default property regime. With limita-
tions to a wife’s ability to work outside the home, under the 1865 Code, there was a presumption that
the husband owned everything in the home. 8 Nuovo digesto italiano 314 (Mariano D’Amelio
ed., 1939). Since this was progressively seen as unfair to the wife, the 1942 Code facilitated a cou-
ple’s ability to opt-in to a community property regime. Id. A community property regime did not,
however, become the default property regime until the 1975 Family Law Reform. In the community
property regime, each spouse is assured a fifty percent stake in property acquired during the marriage
and, unless the couple opts-in to the separazione dei beni, the fruits of individual property acquired
prior to the marriage becomes part of the community property regime. Alpa & Zeno-Zencovich,
supra note 139; Codice civile [C.c.] arts. 177, 179. Under both the 1865 Code and the 1942 Code,
husbands had the exclusive right to manage any property the couple might (if they opted to) hold
in comunione, or under the community property regime. Practically, unless a wife received an item
as a gift, as inheritance, or if items were her personal goods, or parafernali, she did not legally own
any property. This made the majority of wives effectively dependent on their husbands. For certain
items, the 1865 Code did carve out special rules: there was a dowry regime and provisions for a
wife’s eventual retention of her personal goods on her husband’s death. 2 Il digesto italiano 792
(Luigi Lucchini ed., 1929). Today, the community property regime in Italy between spouses reflects
the initial reasoning of the creation of these spheres, excluding goods of a strictly personal use and
goods acquired by gift or succession from the comunione. Codice civile [C.c.] art. 179.
195 Manywomen decried these obstacles. See generally AnnaMariaMozzoni’s contemporary pub-
lications. E.g. Anna Maria Mozzoni, La donna e i suoi rapporti sociali (Milano, Tipografia
Sociale 1864), http://books.google.com/books?id=-1nCnBb7uPEC. It is important to note that
even the architect of the 1865 Code, Pisanelli, had excluded the “marital authorization” clause. It
was instead the Senate who placed it into the Code. For a comprehensive overview of legislation
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries regarding women, see 2 Donne e diritto: due
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quired during the marriage, even in the rare circumstances it was considered a
“joint” good and not exclusively the husband’s, could still only be managed by
the husband.196 A wife was also unable to transfer real property, mortgage the
property in any way, give or obtain capital, or even be present at any of these
transactions, without her husband’s consent.197 This marital authorization law
was not repealed until 1919.198
Dowry, which was regulated yet not required by the 1865 Code, was a tool
used by many to protect women’s property rights to their inheritance.199 The
1865 Code expressly defined dowry as goods brought to the husband by the
wife.200 These goods included real property.201 Unless otherwise specified in the
marriage contract, a dowry could not be mortgaged or otherwise alienated with-
secoli di legislazione—1796/1986 (Agata Alma Cappiello et al. eds., 1988).
196 Michele Sesta, Regime patrimoniale della famigilia 313 (2012) (citing Codice civile
[C.c.] art. 1438 (1865)).
197 See Codice civile [C.c.] art. 134 (1865); see also Lesley Caldwell, Italian Family Mat-
ters 60 (1991). The marital authorization rule effectively nullified the right of a woman to own
property, since, upon her marriage, she could do nothing with it on her own. No exceptions to the
rule were made for personal goods, as in later Codes.
198 Caldwell, supra note 197, at 132 n.24. This effectively subordinated Italian married women,
some of whom had previously managed their property freely, to the authority of their husbands for
some fifty years. Single women, on the other hand, were still free to manage their own property.
Licini, supra note 137, at 18–19.
199 This protection was necessary, especially due to the 1865 Code’s discrimination against women
in the workplace or indeed in almost any profession. Inheritance, and the proper management of it
through the dowry regime, was the most common way, especially when the marriage authorization
rule of 1919 was in effect, for women to be assured security after their husbands’ deaths. One of the
great women leaders of the opposition, Anna Maria Mozzoni, described her frustrations with the
Code, and indeed its skewed view of the reality of the lives of married women, in her many essays.
Mozzoni observed how if indeed man represents the family in its business affairs then the woman
represents it in society. Anna Maria Mozzoni, La donna in faccia al progetto del nuovo
Codice civile italiano (Milano, Tipografia Sociale 1865), reprinted in 2 Donne e diritto: due
secoli di legislazione—1796/1986, supra note 195, at 1221. Because of this, she argued, there
truly was not an Italian man in his right mind who took seriously the letter of the law which gave
him dominion over his wife. Moreover, by impeding women from seeking professions, Mozzoni
argued quite logically, the law was setting women up to go hungry when they were obliged by the
Code to contribute to the maintenance of her husband when he did not have sufficient means to
support himself. Id. at 1230. One of three exceptions to marital authorization in the 1865 code
was when a woman esercitava la mercatura, or was a merchant. Hence, under the 1865 Code,
women’s roles were heavily defined by what social class they were a part of, whether or not they
were married. Codice civile [C.c.] art. 133 (1865). Notwithstanding the conservative nature of the
1865 Italian Civil Code, its Napoleonic influences, and its life in the shadow of the strong presence
of the Catholic Church in Italy, the dialogue that surrounded its regulations of women had a distinct
international flavor. Essays by Mozzoni contain many comparisons to the legal status of women
in other countries, including the United States and England, and the ability of the women in these
countries to be equal to men, especially in work, which did not result, as Mozzoni states “in an
upended world.” Mozzoni, supra, at 1228. It was not only the opposition who noticed and cited
to the American legal system to support their arguments. Indeed, legislatures, as they introduced
bills to be passed, cited to American laws. Such was evident when Micelli, the Agricultural Minister,
proposed legislation in 1880 to regulate the working conditions of women and children in the mines
and factories of Italy and cited to the laws of certain states in the Union that had laws dating from
1813 on the subject. 1 Donne e diritto: due secoli di legislazione—1796/1986, supra note
195, at 210.
200 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 1388 (1865).
201 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 1389 (1865).
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out the consent of both spouses and an appearance in court.202 Like other prop-
erty a wife may have owned, a dowry could only be administered by the husband,
and the husband was also the only person of right under the law in regards to
the dowry, whether it contained moveable or immovable goods.203 Only third
parties could increase a dowry.204 If the husband died, the dowry could be re-
turned to the wife upon her request.205 If there were no request, the dowry fully
became part of the husband’s patrimonio, to be divided between herself and their
children.206 At the time of the 1865 Code, upon their husbands’ death, women,
as surviving spouses, were allowed to succeed only insofar as their husbands had
no other relatives, which included relatives to the tenth degree.207
In 1907, when Villa La Pietra was purchased, Hortense Mitchell was a rich,
sophisticated American heiress who traveled the world. Like the famed English
historian and Tuscan resident Janet Ross, she had bought items abroad prior
to her marriage. Her father had also traveled, and was a sophisticated banker.
Arthur Acton, by comparison, was a struggling art dealer. These facts could suc-
cessfully suggest thatWilliamMitchell bought Villa La Pietra for Hortense either
as a gift or as a dowry. Such a gift would have effectively secured her a home
in which to make her married life, and create a social sphere worthy of an early
twentieth century socialite of Hortense’s caliber. William Mitchell could even
have been inspired by his other daughter Mary’s Italian home in Chicago, which
perhaps he had purchased as well. Under the 1865 Code in effect at the time, if
the Villa was a gift prior to Hortense’s marriage, then she would have retained
sole ownership to it under the separazione dei beni regime upon her marriage
and could have willed it to Harold, bequeathing him clear title. Unfortunately,
according to newspaper announcements, Hortense and Acton married in 1903,
before the purchase of the Villa.208 Therefore, the strongest legal argument for
NYU would be that Villa La Pietra was a gift from William Mitchell to Hort-
ense for the purpose of her marriage, and therefore was her dowry. Under the
1865 Code, the husband managed the dowry and was entitled to the fruits of it.
Therefore, it would make sense that Acton might have hired Elsie to help run it,
especially if Hortense was otherwise engaged in social events in Florence. Until
1919, Hortense could not have managed the property except with Arthur’s per-
mission. This permission would seem to have been granted, especially given all
the parties and events which Hortense hosted at the Villa, which included orga-
nizing lighting, decoration, and other aspects of Villa life for her children and
202 Codice civile [C.c.] arts. 1404–05 (1865).
203 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 1399 (1865). Although it is important to note that a portion of
the dowry could be assigned to the wife for her personal expenses. See 13 Enciclopedia ital-
iana di scienze, lettere ed arti 182 (1932), http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/dote_
(Enciclopedia-Italiana)/.
204 Digesto Italiano, supra note 194, at 792. The entry on separazione dei beni cites to Article
1391 of the 1865 Code, and states that the separation of the dowry was equated and understood as
being the same as a separazione dei beni, or a separation of the wife’s goods from the husband’s.
205 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 1415 (1865).
206 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 1416 (1865).
207 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 742 (1865).
208 Miss Hortense Mitchell English Artist’s Bride, Chi. Daily Trib., May 26, 1903, at 2.
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her guests. An even more concrete indication of Hortense’s ability to manage La
Pietra, if she owned it, is a 1929 contract in which Hortense cedes a portion of
property she owned on the Via Bolognese, between Villa Ruspoli and Villa La
Pietra to the Commune of Florence.209
The 1942 Code continued the tradition of a woman’s dependence upon her
husband, making her subject to his power generally and his right to impose disci-
pline.210 Such a dependency was present even though a wife could own andman-
age her own property during marriage.211 As under the 1865 Code, a woman’s
husband administered her dowry, but if the dowry consisted of an immovable
209 The exact wording of the contract states that Hortense is ceding a piece of her property in
order to enlarge Via Bolognese:
Signora Mitchell Acton Hortense la cessione in gratuita e pubblico suolo di una area
di terreno di sua proprieta, posta in Firenze ed interessata nel’allargamento della Via
Bolognese fra Villa Ruspoli e La Pietra.
See supra note 60. In contrast, when Arthur Acton owned property (namely the other Villas on the
La Pietra property), he contracted himself with the Commune. There are other documents in the
archivio which testify to this. For a list of these other documents, see Risultati Ricerca, l’Archivo
della città: Archivo storico del Comune di Firenze, http://archinet.comune.firenze.it
(last visited Aug. 8, 2015). By searching Acton in the Commune of Florence’s online database, one
finds documents in which Arthur Acton contracted with construction workers to make modifications
to other property on Via Bolognese.
210 Codice civile [C.c.] arts. 143, 145 (1942); see also Alpa & Zeno-Zencovich, supra
note 139, at 47 (“The wife was still considered a weak person who deserved protection and advice,
direction and control.”). The Fascist regime, which ruled Italy from 1922 to the end of World War II,
and its leader Mussolini, stood “for returning women to home and hearth, restoring patriarchal au-
thority, and confining female destiny to bearing babies.” Victoria de Grazia, How Fascism Ruled
Women: Italy, 1922–1945, at 1 (1993). De Grazia notes that ideological responses such as this one
by the Italian regime were part and parcel of larger European attempts where “a restructuring of
gender relations thus went hand in hand with the recasting of economic and political institutions to
secure conservative interests in the face of economic uncertainty and the democratization of public
life.” Id. at 3. According to historians, recognizing women’s legal rights under Fascism therefore
meant recognizing women as central to “population politics.” Id. at 9; see also Julie Thorpe, Popu-
lation Politics in the Fascist Era, Austria’s 1935 Population Index, 25 Human. Res. 45 (2009). This
resulted in repressive and misogynist laws and organizations which attempted to regulate everything
from women’s control of their household accounts, their own bodies, and their ability to work out-
side the home. Within this umbrella of control, however, were pockets of individualism resulting
from different influences upon Italian citizens. In Florence, for example, where we have already seen
Anglo-American expatriates exert considerable influence in the art and real estate markets, “one
might encounter young [Italian] companionate couples in the Anglo-American style,” in contrast to
the strong patriarchal Fascist figure who ruled his family with a proverbial iron fist in more rural
areas. De Grazia, supra, at 12.
211 Barring women from most professions effectively prohibited most of them from obtaining
enough wealth to buy their own property or goods, and therefore whatever home they lived in was
the property of their husband. A wife’s right in succession to only a usufruct of a portion of her
marital patrimony, and not to a definite ownership of a portion of that patrimony, only continued
to weaken a woman’s ability to be independent. Notwithstanding this, as in the 1865 Code, women
still had the duty to contribute to her husbands “maintenance,” if he did not have the means to do
so. Codice civile [C.c.] art. 145 (1942). Women were not allowed to vote in general elections in
Italy until 1946. Alpa & Zeno-Zencovich, supra note 139, at 6. A married woman was not even
given full authority over her children. Instead this was given to the father and conditionally passed
to the mother upon his death. Codice civile [C.c.] art. 316 (1942). According to Caldwell, any
interested party could also object to the mother’s guardianship of the children after the father’s death
and be appointed in their stead, and, upon a woman’s remarriage, the court could set conditions for
the children’s education. Caldwell, supra note 197, at 72–73.
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good, then that property was not transferred automatically to the husband, as
was a dowry of cash, unless expressly declared by the wife.212 A husband also
had the exclusive right to administer the dowry during the marriage and the ex-
clusive right to its fruits.213 Article 193 also specified that if the wife retained title
to her dowry, it must be returned to her in full upon the death of her spouse.214
Under the 1942 Code, the regime of separate estates effectively swayed the bal-
ance of power in marriage in favor of the husband, who in most cases worked
outside the home and therefore bought the property and goods.215 Moreover,
although the marital authorization law was abolished in 1919, transfers of prop-
erty between spouses were not allowed, unless the spouses had a specific agree-
ment, which even then applied only to property acquired after the marriage.216
Even in this case, the husband retained an exclusive right to manage these “joint”
goods.217 The 1942 Code also regulated parafernali, or a wife’s personal goods,
defined as what was not part of her dowry or the family patrimony.218 The wife
had the power to manage these goods herself, but she still was under the obli-
gation to use them to contribute to the responsibilities of marriage and if her
husband used her goods or retained the fruits of them, she had a right to ask
him and his heirs for an accounting.219 Under the 1942 Civil Code, any goods
or property acquired during the marriage, and not exclusively by each spouse,
during the marriage were considered to be community property.220
Upon Arthur’s death in 1953, there is no record of any request by Hortense
for the return of Villa La Pietra. In fact, according to the Beacci account, in a
document filed with the London Probate Registry upon Arthur Acton’s death,
Hortense and Harold were “entitled to administer the estate of said intestate
by the law of the place where the deceased died domiciled.”221 This wording
is interesting because under Italian law, and the 1942 Code in particular which
governs the distribution of Arthur Acton’s estate, even in 1953, women were not
traditionally allowed to “administer” items that were not theirs in the first place.
This wording seems especially relevant given a wife’s right to only a life estate in
any marital property she received upon her husband’s death. This wording may
point to the fact that Villa La Pietra was actually returned to Hortense upon
Arthur’s death, because it had in fact been her dowry. This would also explain
212 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 18 (1942).
213 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 184 (1942).
214 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 193 (1942).
215 Valerio Pocar & Paola Ronfani, Family Law in Italy: Legislative Innovations and Social
Change, 12 L. & Soc. Rev. 607, 632 (1978).
216 Codice civile [C.c.] arts. 210–30 (1942).
217 Id. Community property, under the 1942 Code, could be contracted between the spouses and
the goods they acquired during their marriage fell under this regime. Codice civile [C.c.] art. 215
(1942). Even in this situation only the husband could administer the community property. Codice
civile [C.c.] art. 220 (1942).
218 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 210 (1942).
219 Codice civile [C.c.] arts. 211–12 (1942).
220 Codice civile [C.c.] arts. 167–76 (1942); see also Separazione dei Beni, Dizionario Tre-
canni, http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/separazione-dei-beni-tra-coniugi (last
visited Aug. 8, 2015).
221 Alliata-Lensi Orlandi, supra note 26, at 438.
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why the property was in her name.222
In this case, Hortense could will Villa La Pietra to whomever she wanted. In
fact, she could have even gifted it to Harold before her death, transferring title to
him.223 Under this scenario, Liana Beacci and her heirs have no colorable claim
to the Villa since she was not a natural child of Hortense.224
222 It is worth noting at this juncture that the passage of the Italian Constitution altered the 1942
Civil Code’s codified inequality between men and women, affecting women’s lives. The debates sur-
rounding the drafting of what would become Article 29 highlighted the concern of at once regulating
the family too much, and therefore repeating the mistakes of Fascist predecessors, and the desire to
nevertheless still provide legal protection for the family as an entity. For a detailed discussion of
the debates, see Caldwell, supra note 198, at 61–63. Caldwell quotes from the transcripts of these
debates, and some of these excerpts reflect members of the Constituent Assembly’s concerns that, if
the state were to recognize the family outright as a natural society, then this would mean recognition
for families not founded upon marriage: “families . . . that are deprived of the crism [sic] of legality
and the religious sacrament. In this sense concubinage would be recognized by the State.” Id. at 64.
Nevertheless, the tension in the Constitution affected women. While at once recognizing the tenet
of equality, the final Italian Constitution nevertheless provides inherent limits to it. For example,
Article 29 at once intimates man and wife are equal in marriage and yet that this equality is lim-
ited by the unity of the family. Id. at 65. Similarly, Article 37 announced, “Female labour enjoys
equal rights and the same wages for the same work as male labour,” and, in the very next sentence,
“Conditions of work must make it possible for them to fulfill their essential family functions and
ensure the adequate protection of mothers and children.” Art. 37 Costituzione [Cost.]. Work is
presented as subordinate to family responsibilities for both sexes, and women who as mothers in
need of constitutionally mandated protection in the workplace. Caldwell, supra note 197, at 65.
Caldwell notes, “acknowledging that men and women had a different ‘mission’ and that women
were first and foremost familially located made legislating for equality impossible.” Id. Overall, the
Italian Constitution, as historians have noted, semantically equates woman with mother and mother
with family. Id. at 67.
It is important of course to note that, even with this tension, the Constitution presented a new and
previously unheard of legally sanctioned equality between the sexes, especially when compared to the
previous 1865 Code and the 1942 Civil Code, which still existed alongside it. Between the ratification
of the Italian Constitution and the 1975 Reform, various laws began to erode the inherent tension
in laws, which affected the lives and rights of women. They included a law prohibiting the firing of
women during their legally mandated absence of one month prior to the birth of their child through
the first year of their child’s birth (Legge 26 agosto 1950, n. 860, G.U. Nov. 3, 1950, n. 253), the
famous Merlin Law which abolished the State’s regulation of prostitution (Legge 20 febbraio 1958,
n. 75, G.U. Mar. 4, 1958, n. 55), pensions to housewives (Legge 5 marzo 1963, n. 389, G.U. Apr. 3,
1963, n. 90), the ability of women to access all professions and public offices (Legge 9 febbraio
1963, n. 66, G.U. Feb. 19, 1963, n. 48). For a comprehensive list of laws that affected women in
Italy beginning after the Constitution and which had a profound effect on the status and rights of
women in Italy, see Le leggi delle donne che hanno cambiato l’Italia, Fondazione Nilde Iotti
(Apr. 2012), http://www.fondazionenildeiotti.it/docs/documento4338870.pdf. Opinions
by the Corte di Cassazione and the Constitutional Court also had profound effect, including a
1966 Cassazione decision that declared null and void collective contracts resulting contrary to
Article 37 of the Constitution, and a 1968 Constitutional Court decision declaring it unconsti-
tutional for female adultery to be considered a crime. Corte Cost., 19 dicembre 1968, n. 126,
http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/1968/12/28/068C0126/s1. The previous law pun-
ished the adulterous wife and her lover with one-year imprisonment, while a husband’s adultery was
not punished at all. In 1970, Legge 1 dicembre 1970, n. 898, G.U. Dec. 3, 1970, n. 306, introduced
divorce into Italian law.
223 Alliata-Lensi Orlandi, supra note 25, at 376.
224 It is worth noting, for completeness, that there is a small possibility that Liana Beacci and her
heirs could still lay claim to the Villa. In this case, Article 538 of the 1942 Civil Code revised with
the 1975 Family Law Reform would be applied, since Harold Acton died in 1994. According to
the regime of successione leggittima in place under this Code, Liana Beacci could claim one-third
240 Notre Dame J. Int’l & Comp. L. [vol. 5:1
C NYU successfully claims Hortense set up a legal entity, whether
a corporation or trust, placing legal title to Villa La Pietra in
such entity, thereby bequeathing clear title to her son Harold,
and then to NYU
In his American last will and testament, Harold Acton bequeathed his shares in
the La Pietra Corporation, which holds title to Villa La Pietra, to NYU. This
bequest is startling when compared to Hortense’s supposed will in which she
leaves no real estate. Having established that Hortense Mitchell was a rich, so-
phisticated American heiress, it will come as no surprise to learn that she had a
trust, the Hortense Acton Charitable Trust, currently administered by Bank of
America in Chicago.225 NYU is listed as the trust recipient, and NYU has in fact
recorded the trust as an asset in previous litigation.226 Although Hortense’s trust
is registered as founded in 1995, these dates often represent the date registered
by the IRS and not the true date of the trust’s inception.227 If Hortense’s father
set up her trust prior to her marriage, and then he or Hortense placed the title to
Villa La Pietra not in her name but directly into this trust, then that trust, located
in the United States, would most likely have been ruled by American trust law
of the early twentieth century. During this period, it was indeed common for
wealthy Americans to set up trusts for their daughters and to then administer
them.228 In these cases, trusts were part of a daughter’s inheritance. Under this
regime, early twentieth century women could inherit trusts, and in fact it was
the preferred way for fathers to assure their daughters’ futures in the face of ir-
responsible husbands.229 If Villa La Pietra was indeed part of Hortense’s trust,
and American law applied, Liana Beacci and her heirs would have no colorable
claim to the Villa, notwithstanding that it was purchased during Hortense’s mar-
riage. The Villa would have been bought and placed in the trust by Hortense’s
father effectively as a gift, which is part of the separazione dei beni under the
1942 Code and not part of marital community property.230
The La Pietra Corporation is organized under the laws of Panama, making it
of the villa since Harold died without children, but left her, an ascendente leggittimo, or ascendant
with right (understood as the brothers, sisters, and other relatives before the sixth degree). In this
scenario, Liana Beacci would also be an ascendente leggittimo only if she were able to obtain a
declaration of paternity. There is also the possibility that the Italian courts will extend the definition
of the family, as suggested by the 2012 filiazione reform and apply current norms of succession to a
Beacci inheritance suit. See generally Dossetti, supra note 128; Barba, supra note 116.
225 IRS Form 990-PF, Return of Private Foundation, Hortense Acton Charitable Trust (2009) (on
file with author).
226 Brief for Appellant at i, Eidlisz v. New York University, 15 N.E.3d 730 (N.Y. 2010) (No. 2010-
0128), 2009 WL 6692534, at *i.
227 Using the Ruling Date for Research, NCCS: Nat’l Ctr. for Charitable Stat.,
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/knowledgebase/detail.php?linkID=762&category=83&
xrefID=3433 (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
228 SeeWomen, Enterprise& Society, Harv. Bus. Sch., http://www.library.hbs.edu/hc/wes/
collections/women_law/trust_guardianship/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
229 Jens Becker, Inherited Wealth 95 (2008).
230 Codice civile [C.c.] art. 168 (1942) (describing how third parties may vest ownership of
property in one spouse).
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impossible to obtain its Articles of Incorporation.231 However, friends of Harold
Acton say that La Pietra Corporation was founded during Hortense’s life, and
that she then transferred her shares to Harold before his death.232 If this is so,
various issues may arise, including the legality of placing an Italian property
registered as a Bene Culturale, in the hands of a foreign corporation.233 Such
a discussion is beyond the scope of this Note, but if Hortense incorporated the
Villa after the 1942 Code came into force, and her father had previously gifted it
to her, then the laws of separazione dei beni would still apply. Therefore, Liana
Beacci would have no colorable claim.
D Hortense and Acton acquired the Villa together, thereby
creating a colorable claim by Liana Beacci to Villa La Pietra and
the property
The facts show that, contrary to the claims in Elsie Beacci’s diaries, Hortense
was indeed a cultured woman who was very aware of her Florentine surround-
ings. When she met Arthur in Egypt it is easy to imagine that they bonded over a
love of art, and a common Florentine dream. Perhaps they plotted and planned
to create a place of former Renaissance glory together.234 Hortense frequently
accompanied Arthur on trips around Europe, and they most certainly bought
artwork together, perhaps dreaming up exactly where they would place it to-
gether in the Villa.235 With the sights of other countries so prevalent in the minds
of Italians as they surveyed their own legal landscape, it is easy to imagine that
the many American and English women who journeyed to Italy themselves, as
231 Last Will and Testament of Harold Acton, supra note 12, at 2–3.
232 Interview with Giovanni Conti, Antiquarian, in Florence, Italy (Summer 2011). This interview
was conducted in person during the course of my research on the life of Hortense Mitchell Acton.
233 Alliata-Lensi Orlandi, supra note 25, at 183.
234 The wedding announcement of Hortense and Acton indicates that they met in Egypt: “Mrs.
Acton . . . returned from Europe last summer, only to leave Chicago early in the winter for a sojourn
in Egypt with her mother. It was while abroad that she met Mr. Acton.” Miss Hortense Mitchell
English Artist’s Bride, supra note 208. One indication that both Hortense and Acton bought Villa
La Pietra together, and that the Villa embodied their common vision, can be found in a newspaper
article. Cousin Eve, Writer Visits Campo Santo, City of the Dead, Chi. Daily Trib., Aug. 13, 1933,
at F1.
The most charming time I had in Florence was at the Acton villa, La Pietra, upon the
high hill called Via Bolognese . . . The house, gloriously frescoed, was in good repair
when bought by the Actons years ago. And what they have added to it is all in the
picture. A small salone, very lovely, a walnut paneled bookroom of the cardinal with
windows high and grilled against enemies and sieges . . . . In the garden the Actons
have done their most remarkable magic.
Id.
235 In this way, Hortense and Arthur would have been quite similar to other expatriate couples of
their day and who came before them. Newspaper articles indicate that Hortense and Arthur viewed
art exhibits together. May Birkhead, Arthur Actons view Parisian Art Exhibits, Chi. Daily Trib.,
Dec. 18, 1938, at F4. Birkhead reports, “The former Miss Hortense Mitchell of Chicago . . . and her
husband Arthur Acton, found time, during their recent stay in Paris, to interest themselves, as they
have for years, in the peaceful fields of art. All who have visited their beautiful home near Florence
will recall its many treasures and their superb setting. Their historic villa, La Pietra, lies on the Via
Bolognese, some distance out of the city, and has a splendid view of the famous city.” Id.
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Hortense did, would have noticed the legal differences between their homes and
the Italian landscape as well. Most noticeably, as Americans flocked to Florence
in the nineteenth century, where the living was cheap and the artistic inspiration
free flowing, the true bargain was real estate.236 Americans rented out the homes
of Italian noble families for a steal, and bought entire villas.237 It is not a stretch
to imagine these adventurous Americans informing themselves on the laws of
the day in order to ascertain their relationship to their property.238
Famous English colonists such as Janet Ross, who moved to Florence with
her husband during the reign of the 1865 Code, must have surely informed them-
selves about the title to the art they bought with their husbands just as assuredly
as they informed themselves on local Tuscan traditions.239 In such a case, ironi-
cally, Hortense’s sophistication, culture, and love for art would be Villa La Pietra
and NYU’s downfall. If Arthur contributed something to the purchase of the
Villa, and he and Hortense bought it and flourished there together, then Villa
La Pietra was part of their patrimonio, their marital property. Under the 1942
Code, prior to the 1975 Reform, such property, although in theory belonging to
each spouse, in reality gave the surviving spouse—here, Hortense—no property
interest in it, but only a life estate. Therefore, upon Arthur’s death, Liana Beacci
and her heirs would be entitled to a portion of five-twelfths of Villa La Pietra.
In this case, the question of how to give the Beacci family their portion of
the inheritance is an open one. According to the 1942 Code, Villa La Pietra
might not be able to be sold or divided. If the Beacci family does not wish to
accept any monetary reimbursement (and they have said they do not in fact want
to),240 then Villa La Pietra will have to remain intact. Moreover, as a registered
236 Ben Dowling, Queen Bee of Tuscany: The Redoubtable Jane Ross 99 (2013).
237 For a description of the numerous Florentine villas owned by Anglo-Florentines see Grazia
Gobbi Sica The Florentine Villa: Architecture, History, Society 97–101 (2007).
238 While it is true that many members of the Anglo-American colony in Florence in particular
stayed cocooned within their circle of fellow expatriates, just as many colonists became active in
Italian politics. Dowling, supra note 236, at 110–11. American newspapers published in Florence
for the Anglo-American audience at the time Villa La Pietra was purchased contain regular updates
on the financial markets of the time, in comparative perspective, and notes about curious legal in-
cidents involving art. For example, the October 30, 1906 edition of The Florence Herald makes a
note that “Baron Salvadori, of Trent, who sold portraits by Titian and G.B. Morone to an American
a few weeks ago, is to be prosecuted by the Austrian Government for sending these works of art out
of the country.” Jottings, Florence Herald, Oct. 30, 1906, at 12.
239 Dowling, supra note 236, at 128. Dowling describes a curious antidote about Ross buying the
painting The School of Pan by Luca Signorelli, alongside her husband, only to orchestrate a potential
sale of it days later after a friend from the National Gallery came calling. It is interesting to note
that under the 1865 Code in effect in Italy at the time, the movable property acquired by Janet and
her husband would have been able to be managed solely by her husband, and a sale orchestrated by
Janet only with her husband’s permission. How this would have squared with her English mentality,
her daily routine, and her English familiarity with a married woman’s right to own and manage
her own property under the Women’s Property Act of 1870 is an interesting issue to consider. For
a comparative perspective of the Married Woman’s Property Act within the greater framework of
Italian women’s right to vote, see Giulia Galeotti, Storia del voto alle donne in Italia 23
(2006). Ross later became the manager of her landlord’s tenant mezzadrie farm.
240 See Haden-Guest, supra note 15. “That said, Dialta would prefer a settlement, and she accepts
that La Pietra and its contents should be kept together, ‘and we would like to get in and out of La
Pietra . . . I would like to give maybe a couple of events there a year.’ ” Id.
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member of the International Council of Museums, Villa La Pietra may be subject
to international norms precluding its partition. How these two litigious parties
would manage their rights together under such circumstances remains to be seen.
VI Conclusion
The case involving Villa La Pietra exists in the midst of a strong tension in Ital-
ian law. The evolution of Italy’s legal attitude towards traditionally subjugated
groups, such as women, children, and especially illegitimate children, has a real
and immediate effect on property currently located in Italy, including property
that has recently been or is now being purchased by American citizens and enti-
ties. What this evolution shows is that it is crucial to provide a balance between
new laws that effectuate a more equal legal regime and laws that protect and
recognize historical ownership, which has characterized Anglo-Italian relations
for centuries. NYU introduces Italy to so many young Americans, and yet Liana
Beacci and her family have a legal right to the means NYU uses to make this in-
troduction. Whether the two parties can move beyond their litigation to create
a conversation out of the nuances of this introduction to continue to benefit the
American students who study at Villa La Pietra, which could very well include
an American grandchild of Liana Beacci one day, will be the fundamental result
of the course Italian law and this case decide to take.
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